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ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s new federalism has struck its strongest blows so far on the Clean Water 
Act.  This summer, in Rapanos v. United States, a sharply divided Court nearly struck down a large chunk 
of the Act’s protection of wetlands and other small waterways – five years after an earlier decision had 
narrowed the reach of the Act because of its supposed overreaching into state prerogative.  Why has the 
Clean Water Act been the Court’s favorite target?  One reason is that the statute was fatally flawed when 
enacted.  Congress chose to cover “navigable waters,” but its practical definition has never been clear.  
The result is a statutory and jurisprudential mess, with lessons that extend across issues of constitutional 
law, statutory construction, and, of course, federalism.  The solution, I propose, is to jettison the Act’s 
reliance on the misguided term “navigable waters.”  Instead, the statute should directly regulate activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce, such as fisheries, migratory birds, floods, and agriculture.  
An Act whose limits are tied to the law of the commerce power would be shielded from the federalist ax. 
I propose revised statutory language for reviving the Clean Water Act.  
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2A NEW CLEAN WATER ACT 
Paul Boudreaux1
I. INTRODUCTION 
No field of law has felt the impact of the Supreme Court’s revived federalism as sharply 
as the Clean Water Act.2 This is ironic, considering that the Act has been remarkably successful 
in protecting the nation’s waters from pollution and other degradation; indeed, it has served as a 
model for environmental laws in specific and regulatory law in general.3 Yet the Supreme Court 
twice in recent years has restricted the reach of the Act, relying each time on the constitutional 
limits of Congressional powers and on the vague fundamental terms of the Act itself.   This year, 
the Court in Rapanos v. United States confined the reach of the Act’s linchpin term “navigable 
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2 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).  Although the statute as originally enacted in 1972 was 
formally called the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. 92-500, 866 Stat. 844 (1972), it 
is today more commonly called the Clean Water Act.  The Act generally makes it unlawful to 
“discharge … any pollutant” into “navigable waters” without a permit.  Id. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12).  
“Pollutant” is broadly defined to cover almost any addition of material.  See id. § 1362(6).  For 
the specific category of discharges of “dredged or fill material,” which most often occurs when 
someone is filling in a wetland or other small water body, permits are granted by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, pursuant to § 404 of the Act, id. § 1344. For other pollution, permits are 
granted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, usually with the requirement that the 
polluter use a level of “best technology” to limit the amount of pollution.  See id. §§ 1311(b), 
1314(b).   
 
3 See, e.g., Oliver Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10469, 10469 
(1999) (calling the Clean Water Act “the most successful environmental program in America”); 
Bruce Babbitt, Between the Flood and the Rainbow:  Our Covenant to Protect the Whole of 
Creation, 2 ANIMAL L. 1, 2 (1996) (former Secretary of the Interior Babbitt calling the Act “the 
most successful of all our environmental laws”). 
3waters”4 in a muddled decision that might prevent federal protection of many wetlands and other 
small water bodies.5 As many feared, the fractured Court’s decision (there was no majority 
opinion) in Rapanos merely muddied the statutory waters.  As it now stands, lower courts, and 
perhaps the Supreme Court again, will yet have to decide whether each of the nation’s thousands 
of wetlands – as well as ephemeral ponds, arroyos, and other single-state water bodies – are 
protected by the federal Act or subject only to the vagaries of state law.6 Proposals seeking to 
redefine the key terms have been proposed in Congress, although it is unlikely that a quick 
legislative fix would either attract the interest of many lawmakers or solve the fundamental faults 
with the Act’s construction.7
4 The Act regulates pollution and dumping into “navigable waters,” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006) 
(generally, no polluting of “navigable waters” without a federal permit),  id. § 1441 (no filling in 
of “navigable waters” without a permit).  The term “navigable waters” is defined as “the waters 
of the United States and the territorial seas,” without further explanation.  Id.§ 1362(7).      
 
5 Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).  Rapanos addressed the issue of whether the 
filling in of wetlands that were close to, but not attached to, nearby rivers and lakes constituted a 
discharge into “navigable waters.” See 126 S. Ct. at 2214-15.  The discharge of fill material into 
navigable waters requires a permit, under 33 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  Although a majority of justices 
voted to vacate the judgments of the Sixth Circuit, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005) and 391 F.3d 
704 (6th Cir. 2005), which had held that the wetlands were indeed “navigable waters,” there was 
no majority opinion of the Supreme Court.  Thus the Sixth Circuit is now faced with having to 
apply a new standard in the face of disagreement in the high court as to what that standard should 
be.   
 
6 Wetlands serve to provide habitat for shellfish, birds, and other wildlife, act as a sponge to 
reduce flooding, protect shorelines from erosion, recharge groundwater aquifers, and trap 
sediment and pollution that otherwise would run into rivers and lakes.  See U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, What Are Wetlands?, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/vital/nature.html. 
 
7 See C. Garvey, Bills Floated on Wetlands Muddle, 109 ROCK PRODUCTS 17 (2006), 2006 
WLNR 14273188 (discussing legislative proposals to revise the Clean Water Act in response to 
Rapanos).  Senator Russ Feingold (D.-Wis.) proposed in summer 2006 a bill to change 
“navigable waters” to “waters” and to clarify that the later term covers wetlands intermittent 
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4I propose a new vision for the Clean Water Act.  I recommend that the Act discard the 
difficult-to-apply statutory trigger that depends on the location of the water body.  Under the 
existing system, the Act covers all “navigable waters,” but no pollution of water bodies that do 
not fall within this ill-fitting term.  If, as the federalist plurality in Rapanos suggested, the current 
Act is restricted to only “fairly permanent and continuous water bodies,” then even truly harmful 
pollution of wetlands cannot be regulated by the Act in its current form.8 Instead, I propose that 
the Act be refocused for the twenty-first century to regulate, instead, certain categories of 
pollution, regardless of location. This change would match the Clean Water Act with most other 
environmental laws, which are triggered by the level of environmental harm, not by location.9
Under the proposed new conception, pollution and other degradation of water would be regulated 
if, as a category, it substantially affects interstate commerce.  This is, of course, the limit of 
Congress’s constitutional authority.10 Thus, for example, the dumping of ecologically harmful 
 
water bodies.  See S. 912, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c109:S.+912:. 
 
8 126 S. Ct. at 2226-27 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
 
9 For example, the Clean Air Act is triggered by any emission into the air of large amounts of 
hazardous air pollutants, see 42 U.S.C. § 7512 (2006), and large amounts of the more common 
“criteria” air pollutants in nonattainment areas, see id. § 7502(c)(5), § 7503.  Similarly, the 
“Superfund” statute (formally the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act, or “CERCLA”) is triggered by a release of hazardous wastes or other hazardous 
substances into “the environment,” which is broadly defined to include soil, water, and air, 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(8), when such a release presents “an imminent and substantial danger to the 
public health or welfare,” id. § 9604(a)(1).  Because the reach of the statutes are not limited to 
activities that affect interstate commerce, these laws potentially are vulnerable to challenge.  For 
a discussion of the potential vulnerabilities of environmental laws other than the Clean Water 
Act, see Part III.B infra. 
 
10 In Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Supreme Court set forth a narrower 
interpretation of the commerce power than it had followed for more than half a century.  
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5gypsum into a water body would be covered if it would affect trade or migratory wildlife in more 
than one state, regardless of whether the affected water body is a river, lake, or isolated wetland.  
On the flip side, an activity that has only purely local effects, such as the filling in of small pond 
that has no connection to other waters or commerce that moves interstate, would not be covered 
by the federal law.  A proposal for revised statutory language is set forth in Part V.A. 
 Such a new, action-triggered conception of the Clean Water Act would require 
government regulators to do more than simply place water bodies either in the box of covered, 
“jurisdictional” waters, or in the box of unregulated waters.  I propose that this admittedly 
difficult job be given to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which is in charge of most 
of the federal pollution statutory regimes.11 Such work is necessary for the Clean Water Act to 
fulfill once again its promise of serving as a national system of protecting America’s water 
bodies – and the people and ecosystems that depend on such waters – from unwanted harm.  
 
II. A SHORT DIVE INTO THE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
The federal Clean Water Act holds a rather unclean history.  In the Supreme Court’s two 
major water law decisions of the current century, the Court in effect threw up its hands in 
resignation in trying to determine what Congress meant in 1972 by using “navigable waters” as 
 
Nonetheless, it reaffirmed that Congress may regulate activities that “substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”  Id. at 558-59.   I discuss Lopez and related cases in Part III.A infra.  
 
11 For reasons of history, as explained in Part II infra, the 1972 Clean Water Act divided 
responsibility between the Environmental Protection Agency, which holds the authority to grant 
permits to those seeking to discharge pollutants into navigable waters from a point source (and 
which may grant such permitting activity to state authorities), 33 U.S.C. § 1452(a),(b), and the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which holds the authority (with rarely-used oversight by the 
EPA) to grant permits for the discharge of “fill or dredged material” into navigable waters, id. §
1441(a)-(d).  Much of the latter category involves the filling in of wetlands.      
 
6the statute’s primary trigger – with the exception that all agree that Congress did not mean to 
restrict the Act only to waters on which boats can navigate.  In this section, I provide an 
assessment – admittedly opinionated and sometimes speculative – of the long but not particularly 
complicated history of this fateful, and ultimately unwise, choice.        
 
A.  Water Regulation Before 1972 
Concerns over the condition of the natural world were largely local concerns in the first 
hundred years of the United States.  In an era before man-made toxic liquids, towering 
smokestacks, or an understanding of epidemiology, pollution control – to the extent it existed – 
was left largely to local governments.12 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, cities 
such as Chicago and Cleveland restricted the placement of air-polluting industries in order to 
limit the noxiousness of the air.13 Meanwhile, people understood that polluting water was 
harmful, of course, but dumping wastes in rivers, lakes, and harbors served as an easy way to 
dispose of unwanted liquids and solids, including sewage.14 These polluted waterways led to 
 
12 See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, WILLIAM GOLDFARB, ROBERT L. 
GRAHAM, LISA HEINZERLING, & DAVID A. WIRTH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW AND SOCIETY [hereinafter PLATER] 42-43 (3d ed. 2004) (briefly discussing the rise of 
environmental law from local control to federal control); FRED BOSSELMAN, COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE TAKING ISSUE: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF 
GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE USE OF PRIVATELY-OWNED LAND WITHOUT 
PAYING COMPENSATION TO THE OWNERS 84 (1973) (discussing local 18th and 19th century laws 
that regulated urban health and the environment ). 
 
13 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worked; What's 
Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1575-77 (1991) (discussing the slow rise of 
“smoke” laws in the urban world, from 13th century laws in London to 19th century ordinances 
in America cities such as  Chicago, Cleveland, and St. Louis).  
 
14 See, e.g., THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE 
WATERS OF NEW ENGLAND 49, 191-206-06 (1991) (discussing the widespread dumping of 
pollutants into rivers in New England, America’s first highly industrialized region in the 19th 
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7local outbreaks of cholera, typhus, and diphtheria.15 In order to provide city residents with clean 
water, cities built reservoirs to collect rain water, largely without treatment.16 None of this 
concerned the federal government. 
What did spark a national concern was the impediment to commerce of large-scale dumping 
in the nation’s rivers and harbors.  Because such water bodies are public “commons,” people 
naturally find it appealing to dump their refuse in such commons, for which there is no private 
owner to complain.17 Sometimes, such dumping impeded boat traffic.  If governments tried to 
regulate such dumping, they would be often be stymied by governmental boundaries.  Major 
rivers, for example, often form local or state boundaries, complicating the matter of 
 
century); CHARLES WARREN, MANAGING SCOTLAND’S ENVIRONMENT, 128-31 (2002) (referring 
to the rivers near industrial areas in Scotland in the 19th century as being in effect “open 
sewers”). 
 
15 See WILLIAM CHARLES GRIFFIN, TAMING THE LAST FRONTIER 5 (1974) (discussing the harms 
caused by dumping of pollutants in urban rivers). 
 
16 See, e.g., Joel A. Tarr, The City and the Natural Environment (discussing the construction of 
clean water urban reservoirs in the nineteenth century), at
http://www.gdrc.org/uem/doc-tarr.html; Bryant Park Corp. Bryant Park: History, at
http://www.bryantpark.org/history/reservoir-square.php (explaining the building of the Croton 
Distributing Reservoir in midtown Manhattan in the 1840s, “one of the greatest engineering 
triumphs of nineteenth-century America.”  The Manhattan reservoir is now Bryant Park, home to 
the central New York Public Library. 
 
17 See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) 
(explaining that people have an incentive to overuse and abuse commonly held resources).  Try 
this experiment:  When driving through a residential neighborhood, notice how the roadside 
changes when one passes a vacant lot.  People are encouraged to dump their empty soda cans, 
cigarette butts, and other garbage on such property, because there is likely to be no owner there 
to complain.   Moreover, without someone watching over such sites, they tend to quickly fill 
with refuse, which only encourages more littering.  Many scholars have responded to Hardin’s 
pessimism with arguments that the commons is not always doomed to tragedy, through means 
such as voluntary restraints, see Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
711 (1986), and the incentive to look elsewhere for additional resources, see Cox, No Tragedy of 
the Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 49 (1985).  
 
8governmental jurisdiction.18 Indeed, authorities in some states might have welcomed dumping 
that would affect adversely the neighboring state, thus helping commerce in one’s home state.19 
In response to a growing problem of dumping in the commercial waterways of an 
industrializing nation, Congress in 1899 enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act, as a way of 
bringing some federal control to the problem.20 The statute regulated various activities of 
dumping into or blocking any “navigable water.”21 Congress used the term “navigable water” 
because its goal was to avoid pollution “whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or 
obstructed.”22 Indeed, a 1838 federal law had previously made it unlawful to engage in 
commerce on the “navigable waters” without a permit.23 Facilitating such navigation, which no 
single state could full control on its own (the quintessential Mark Twain era barge trip from St. 
Louis to New Orleans, for example, meant meandering into seven different states!), was a 
 
18 For most of their courses, both the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, the two greatest waterways 
of the eastern United States, form a boundary among states.  Most big cities of 19th century 
America, including Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Pittsburgh, 
Cincinnati, Cleveland, Chicago, St. Louis, and New Orleans, lay on large rivers, bays, or lakes 
that were major lanes of waterborne commerce.    
 
19 If one dumps waste into the Ohio River at Evansville, Ind., for example, much of the 
pollution is likely to affect Kentucky, across the river, and Illinois, downriver, as much or more 
than it would affect Indiana. 
 
20 Ch.  425; 30 Stat. 1151 (1899), currently codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 (2006). 
 
21 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 407 (unlawful to discharge “refuse” into the “navigable water” without 
a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).  This section of the Rivers and Harbors Act is 
often called the “Refuse Act.”  
22 Id. 
 
23 5 Stat. 304 (1838).  In The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563-65 (1871), the Supreme 
Court held that Congress meant “navigable waters” to refer to whether a boat could in fact 
navigate on such water, and not the English practice of using this term to refer only to waters that 
were subject to the ebb and flow of the tides. 
 
9quintessential example of Congress’s enacting a law to facilitate “commerce …among the 
several states.”24 Section 13 of the 1899 Act, often called by itself the Refuse Act, required a 
permit to dump any “refuse matter of any kind or description whatever … into any navigable 
water of the United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water ….”25 
In the busier and more industrialized twentieth century, Congress dipped it toes tentatively 
into further regulation of water pollution.  It enacted a comparatively minor federal water law in 
1948, which imported the term “navigable waters” from the 1899 Act, 26 and amended it a 
number of times before 1972, each time retaining the term “navigable waters.”27 Meanwhile, the 
1960s saw an awakening of environmental consciousness in the nation,28 highlighted by 
sensational and publicized incidents such as Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River “catching on fire,”29 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 
25 Id. § 407.  Section 9 of the Rivers and Harbors Act required a federal permit for any dam or 
structure that would cross a waterway and might impede navigation, see id. § 401, while section 
10 required a permit for any other work that might hamper navigation.  See id. § 403.
26 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). 
 
27 Amendments to the 1948 Act included the Water Pollution Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 
84-660, 70 Stat. 498 (1956); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 
87-88, 75 Stat. 204 (1961); the Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 
(1965); the Clean Water Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (1966); and the 
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970). 
 
28 For a thoughtful discussion of the rise of environmental consciousness in the nation in the 
1960s and 1970s, see PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE 91-145 (1993); see also PLATER,
supra note12, at 43-44 (giving a concise and opinionated overview of the public’s opinion of the 
environment in the 20th century). 
 
29 Countless sources have repeated the tale of the Cuyahoga River “bursting into flames.”  
PHILIP SHABECOFF, supra note 28, at 111.  Professor Jonathan H. Adler has explained more 
soberly that the infamous fire of 1969 was caused by an oil slick and various debris that were 
trapped under a railroad trestle.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga:  Reconstructing 
a History of Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89, 90 (2002).  Adler, a 
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the huge oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, Cal.,30 and the scandalous polluting of the James 
River in southern Virginia by kepone pesticide wastes.31 This new spotlight on the problem of 
pollution was coupled with the 1960s’ belief in federal legislation as a means of transforming 
America for the public good, just as Congress had recently done for civil rights and poverty, for 
example.32 Perhaps in response to the growing concern over water pollution, the federal courts 
in the 1960s for the first time interpreted “refuse” under the 1899 Act to include liquid industrial 
wastes that had no effect upon navigation;33 this new interpretation of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act was a wake-up call for new legislation to specify how and when polluters could discharge 
into the nation’s waterways.34 After Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970, which set up a 
 
federalist, also argues that local efforts had already made progress in cleaning up the Cuyahoga 
before the sensational 1969 incident.  See id. at 90-97.  
 
30 See Keith C. Clark, The Santa Barbara Oil Spill: A Retrospective (2002), available at 
http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/~kclarke/Papers/SBOilSpill1969.pdf#search=%22%22santa%20barba
ra%22%20oil%20spill%22.  
 
31 For a discussion of the James River kepone pollution and litigation, see William Goldfarb, 
Kepone: A Case Study, 8 ENVTL. L. 645 (1994), William Goldfarb, Changes in the Clean Water 
Act Since Kepone, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 603 (1995).  For a summary of Goldfarb’s telling of the 
kepone story, see PLATER, supra note12, at 48-57. 
 
32 The most famous social statute was the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which made unlawful race 
and sex discrimination in employment and accommodations, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, 
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).  A chief anti-poverty law was 
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2291-2995l (2006), which established the “head start” and community action programs.  
 
33 See U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966) (liquid pollution is “refuse” under the 
1899 Act); U.S. v. Republic Steel, 362 U.S. 482 (1960).  For a brief history of the transformation 
of the Refuse Act and its role as an impetus to the 1972 Clean Water Act, see PLATER, supra note 
12, at 958-61.  
34 The reinterpretation of the Rivers and Harbors Act in the 1960s after decades of dormancy is 
reminiscent one of the Supreme Court 1968’s reinterpretation of a section of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982,  to cover, for the first time, racial discrimination in housing by 
private landowners, not just by government.  See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 
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massive and complex system for the federal and state governments each to play a role in 
decreasing air pollution,35 Congress turned its attention to water pollution in 1972.      
 
B.   A Quick Dip Into the Fetid Waters of Interpreting the 1972 Clean Water Act  
The task seems deceptively simple.  What did Congress “mean” in 1972 when it based the 
Clean Water Act on whether the water being polluted is a “navigable water”?36 A number of 
courts have examined the question and, in effect, given up.37 As a result, in this year’s Rapanos 
(1968).  The Court’s activism also presages the twenty-first century reinterpretation of the 1972 
Clean Water Act in Rapanos and its 2001 predecessor, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers [SWANCC], 531 U.S. 139 (2001) (holding that the term 
“navigable waters” does not include “isolated” wetlands) .   
 
35 The Clean Air Act is a quintessential example of cooperative federalism, through which the 
federal and state governments each play a role and each make important decisions in the 
regulatory scheme.  Under the Air Act, the federal government creates a list of what are called 
the “criteria” pollutants (the most common air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide and the 
pollutants that cause ozone), 42 U.S.C. § 7408, and a list of the rarer but more dangerous 
“hazardous” air pollutants.  Id. § 7412.  The federal government also uses science to develop the 
“national ambient air quality standards” – that is, the maximum concentrations in the air of the 
criteria air pollutants that it considers to be safe.  Id. § 7409. Then, the states must develop plans 
to regulate, in effect by whatever means each state chooses, air pollution in the state to meet 
these levels.  Id. § 7410 (state must create “implementation plans”).  Because of the 
cumbersomeness of this original system, and the tremendous latitude given to states, many of 
which failed to produce successful plans, Congress amended the CAA in 1977 and 1990 to make 
it more uniform nationwide, especially through the requirement of federal permits for some 
pollutants in some areas.  See, e.g., id. §§ 7502(c)(5), 7503 (requiring permits and the use of 
specified technology levels for all major new and modified sources of pollution in areas in which 
the pollution levels have not attained the national ambient air quality standards).  For a brief 
history of the evolution of the Clean Air Act, see PLATER, supra note 12, at 552-57.   
 
36 Section 301(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006), requires compliance with permit and 
other provisions for a “discharge of a pollutant,” which is defined as the addition of any pollutant 
from a point source into “navigable waters.”  Id. § 1362(12).  A discharge of “dredged and fill 
material” into “navigable waters” requires a permit under § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).   
 
37 In Rapanos, none of the opinions attempted to make a case for interpretation based on 
legislative history. Writing for a plurality, Justice Scalia cited the vague statutory “objective,” 33 
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decision, Justice Scalia, a skeptic of interpreting federal laws broadly, opened up a dictionary to 
come up with a rather narrow construction in his plurality opinion.38 Meanwhile, Justice 
Stevens, friendlier to broad congressional enactments, fell back on Chevron deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of a vague statutory phrase, in his dissent.39 In his concurrence with the 
judgment, Justice Kennedy argued for another definition, which Justice Scalia then asserted is 
limited to Shakespearean poetry.40 Meanwhile, legal scholars have felled many trees (and will 
 
U.S.C. § 1251(a), and the statute’s “policy” of reserving “primary responsibilities” to the states 
to regulate water pollution, id. § 1251(b), but little other history.  See 126 S. Ct. at 2214, 2223; 
see also id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing the statutory “objective,” but little other 
legislative history), id. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting a broad interpretation, but 
citing no history).  In SWANCC, the Court made only limited references to the legislative history, 
in large part because of the paucity of evidence.  See 531 U.S. at 680-81.  A similarly quick 
study was done in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 133-34 (1985), the 
Court’s first foray into determining the meaning of “navigable waters.”   
 
38 126 S. Ct. at 2220-21 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
 
39 Id. at 2252-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting), citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (when a statute is unclear, courts must defer to any 
reasonable interpretation by the federal agency authorized to administer the statue).  
 
40 126 S. Ct. at 2242 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (referring to a definition of 
“waters” as “flood or inundation,” from the same 1954 Webster’s dictionary that Justice Scalia 
had used).  Justice Scalia noted that the example given in the dictionary is to Shakespeare, from 
which he then concluded that the meaning is merely “an alternative, somewhat poetic usage.” Id. 
at 2221 n. 4 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality).  The quotation in the dictionary – “the peril of 
waters, wind, and rocks” – comes from THE MERCHANT OF VENICE: I, iii.  Indeed, a search of the 
term “waters” in the works of Shakespeare reveals a number of usages that seem to refer to 
floods or inundations.  See RhymeZone: Shakespeare Search, 
http://www.rhymezone.com/r/ss.cgi?q=waters&mode=k (result of search of “waters”).  The 
poetic usage of “waters” is not reserved to Shakespeare, as shown by the famous biblical passage 
from Amos: “Let justice roll down like waters.”  AMOS 5:23 (Am. Standard Version), 
http://bible.cc/amos/5-24.htm. 
 
13
doubtless churn up many more after Rapanos) trying to figure out, on skimpy evidence, whether 
the history points toward either a broad or narrow interpretation of “navigable waters.”41 
It is not my intention in this Article to join either raft of interpretation.  The question of 
congressional “intent” of a statute as significant as the Clean Water Act is complicated, of 
course, by disagreement over how to approach the inquiry.  The author of the plurality opinion in 
Rapanos, Justice Scalia, is noted for his cogently reasoned objections to the use of legislative 
history.42 If a legislative explanation is important enough, one objection goes, why wasn’t it 
placed in the statute itself?  And how do interpreters know whether a comment made in a report 
written by congressional staffers or a statement craftily placed in debate by a sole member of 
Congress constitutes the intent of all or even most of those who voted for the legislation?43 
Indeed, we do not know whether a majority of members of Congress held any common 
 
41 Perhaps the most notable work supporting a narrow interpretation of “navigable waters” has 
been Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelberg, Could SWANCC Be Right?  A New Look at 
the Legislative History of the Clean Water Act, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11042 (2002).  This work 
relied in large part on the supposed motivation of Congress in 1972 as a desire to correct errors 
in the Army Corps’ interpretation of the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act.  See id. at 11045-49.   
 The literature arguing for a broad interpretation has been more extensive.  Responding 
directly to Albrecht and Nickelsburg was Lance D. Wood, Don’t Be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction 
Extends to All Non-Navigable Tributaries of the Traditional Navigable Waters and the Their 
Adjacent Wetlands (A Response to the Virginia Albrecht/Stephen M. Nickelsburg ELR Article, to 
the Fifth Circuit’s Decision In re Needham, and to the Supreme Court’s Dicta in SWANCC), 34
ENVTL. L. REP. 10187 (2004).  Wood was a long-time environmental lawyer for the Army Corps. 
 Perhaps the most comprehensive work from the academy has been William Funk, The 
Court, The Clean Water Act, and the Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ENVTL. L. REP.
10741 (2001).  Professor Funk argued, citing a Senate Report of the Clean Water Act, that it was 
the intent of Congress "that 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional 
interpretation."  Id. at 10748-49, citing See H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, 92d Cong. 131 (1972).  
 
42 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
31 (1997). 
 
43 See id. (objecting to the notion that courts can ascertain a unified “intent” of members of 
Congress outside the text of the statute). 
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understanding of what “navigable waters” was supposed to mean, considering that Congress 
placed no such understanding in the final statute itself.                    
For present purposes, however, I mention a handful of pieces of evidence, if only to show the 
potential benefits of revising and clarifying the law.  First, the term “navigable waters” is defined 
in the statute as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”44 This is of little 
assistance.  In Rapanos, Justice Scalia concluded that, absent any other compelling evidence, 
“waters” should be interpreted by a dictionary meaning that mentioned only relatively permanent 
bodies of water.45 Other federalists have concluded that the phrase “of the United States” was 
meant to refer generally to waters that move through more than one state, in contrast to the 
remaining “waters of a state.”46 Interestingly, because the definition does not refer to whether 
boats can navigate, federalists do not argue that Congress meant to refer exclusively to waters 
that are navigable-in-fact.47 
44 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006). 
 
45 126 S. Ct. at 2220-21 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
 
46 See Albrecht & Nickelsburg, supra note 41, at 11055.   
 
47 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171 (reiterating that “navigable waters” is not limited to waters 
that are navigable-in-fact).  One piece of legislative history on this point is the statement in a 
congressional conference committee report of Rep. John Dingell (D.-Mich.), who asserted that 
Congress intended to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed "navigable" under 
more traditional meanings of the term.  See S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 144 (1972), 118 Cong. 
Rec. 33756- 33757 (statement of Rep. Dingell).   
 After acknowledging that “navigable waters” are not limited to navigable-in-fact waters, 
the Court in SWANCC then concluded, “We cannot agree that Congress' separate definitional use 
of the phrase ‘waters of the United States’ constitutes a basis for reading the term ‘navigable 
waters’ out of the statute.”  531 U.S. at 172.  This passage appeared to assert that the Supreme 
Court would not allow Congress to define a phrase as it wished – an egregious usurpation of 
power to the courts.        
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Advocates of narrow interpretation also point out that language in a draft Senate bill that 
would have explicitly included “tributaries” was removed before final passage.48 But as Justice 
Scalia might remind us, a failed proposal does not mean that the legislators meant to make such a 
statutory exclusion; if Congress means to exclude something, it can state so in the enacted 
statute.   Moreover, advocates of a broad interpretation cite a Senate Report, which stated that 
the law was intended to cover “tributaries” and that “it is essential that discharge of pollutants be 
controlled at the source.”49 It seems impossible, therefore, to make any definitive conclusions 
about congressional intent from the differences between the draft and final legislation.  
Indeed, legislatures often pass vague legislation because more explicit language would be 
controversial; under this theory, legislators expect the courts to sort out the uncertainties.50 In 
the realm of environmental law, the use of a vague definition of “navigable waters” would not be 
the only example of knowing obfuscation.  In the Endangered Species Act, for example, passed 
the year after the Clean Water Act, environmentalist drafters may have intentionally hid one of 
the most significant requirements of the statute in the middle of a section with an innocuous 
title.51 Such sleight of hand presumably may have led some conservatives to vote for (and 
 
48 See Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelberg, supra note 41, at 11047-48.  A draft 
Senate bill had defined “navigable waters” as “the navigable waters of the United States, 
portions thereof, and the tributaries thereof, including the territorial seas and the Great Lakes.”  
See id. 
49 See S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 77 (1972), 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742. 
 
50 See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942) (asserting that Congress intentionally left 
vague the offenses triable under color of war); James M. Auslander, Reversing the Flow:  The 
Interconnectivity of Environmental Law in Addressing External Threats to Protected Land and 
Waters, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 481, 502 (2006) (asserting that Congress sometimes leaves 
environmental law matters unclear for “political insularity”).    
 
51 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (innocuously entitled “Interagency Cooperation”); id. § (a)(2) 
(imposing on all federal agencies the duty of consulting with an expert wildlife agency about 
 ( … continued on next page …) 
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perhaps even to President Nixon’s signing of) what they viewed as a rather minor law.52 This 
kind of legislative gamesmanship might also serve as a spur to Justice Scalia’s hostility to what 
he considers overreaching by federal agencies and federal courts in applying the law.53 If 
congressional sponsors did not believe they could garner enough votes in favor of a clear, broad 
definition of the reach of an act, is it appropriate for agencies or courts to do it for them? 
One of the most powerful – but not dispositive – arguments in favor of a broad interpretation 
is a practical argument.  As asserted by Lance Wood, a senior attorney for the Army Corps of 
Engineers, “the CWA would be completely ineffectual if non-navigable tributaries were not 
covered.”54 If the Act regulated only navigable-in-fact waterways, then polluters could avoid the 
Act simply by moving their discharges to watery areas, such as small tributaries, that are 
impassible to navigation.  Such an interpretation would make the act a nullity, Wood wrote. 55 
Such an argument of practical interpretation might be expected to appeal to Justice Scalia, who 
has written that a useful method of statutory interpretation is to read the law so that it makes 
 
whether a proposed action would “jeopardize” an endangered species before taking the action 
and imposing upon the agencies the duty of “ensuring” that such jeopardy does not occur).   
52 For a suggestion that the meaty requirements of 16 U.S.C. § 1536 “lay camouflaged” and that 
“the clunky prose style made it unlikely that many members of Congress realized what they were 
approving,” see PLATER, supra note 12, at 777. 
 
53 Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence has been marked by complaints about the heavy hand of 
government on private parties.  One of the most famous was his quotation of an analogy likening  
government land use requirements to “extortion” in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825, 838 (1987).  In Rapanos, he likened the Army Corps’ permit program to that of an 
“enlightened despot” ruling over private property.  126 S. Ct. at 2214. 
 
54 Lance Wood, supra note 41, at 10195. 
 
55 Id. at 10196. 
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sense.56 Indeed, in the Supreme Court’s first foray into interpreting “navigable waters”  – 1985’s 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes57 -- a deferential Supreme Court approved coverage 
of wetlands “adjacent to” navigable-in-fact waterways and their tributaries, in large part because 
of the difficulty of distinguishing between the types of water bodies.58 
But statutes are often compromises, of course.  The Clean Water Act is full of them: the 
law’s crucial definition of “point source” pollution excludes “stormwater” runoff, despite the 
enormous amount of pollutants that run off fields and lawns into the nation’s rivers.59 Another 
exemption is provided in the wetlands-dumping section for “normal farming” activities,60 which 
today constitute the largest single category of water pollution.61 It is conceivable that at least 
 
56 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 
515 U.S. 687, 715-29 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting a vague term in the  
Endangered Species Act by using other sections of the Act in order to make the Act make sense 
as a whole).   
 
57 474 U.S. 121 (1985).  Justice White’s majority opinion for a unanimous Court deferred to the 
Army Corps’ interpretation of “navigable waters” to include all that are “adjacent” to navigable-
in-fact waters.  Id. at 131.  It made sense to cover such waters, the court reasoned, because their 
proximity to navigable-in-fact waters meant that, as a category, discharge into such wetlands 
would be likely to affect the navigable-in-fact waters.  See id. at 124.  The Court’s reasoning 
included a strong presumption of legality of an interpretation by the agency charged with 
administering the statute, consistent with Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources  Defense 
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which had been decided just a year before.  See id. at 131.    
 
58 The Court reasoned that “the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends 
and land begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy task: the transition 
from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one. Rather, between 
open waters and dry land may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs--in short, a huge 
array of areas that are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land. Where 
on this continuum to find the limit of ‘waters’ is far from obvious.”   Id. at 462. 
 
59 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
 
60 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (a) (a).  
 
61 See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1998 WATER QUALITY INVENTORY 
62. 
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some members of Congress viewed the “navigable waters” limitation as a way of dividing 
authority between the federal statute, which would cover only navigable-in-fact waters, and state 
law, which would cover all other water bodies.  Lance Wood argued that states are discouraged 
from enacting tough water pollution laws out of fear of driving business elsewhere – the so-
called “race to the bottom.”62 While this may be true, it is also true Congress is free to enact 
feeble, compromise laws and is free to leave certain realms of regulation to the states, as it does 
in many areas.63 
Environmentalists point to language in the Clean Water Act’s introduction that the statute’s 
goal was to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
waters.”64 Such a task certainly would be facilitated by giving it a broad reach into wetlands, 
gulleys, and even man-made waterways.  But this generalized statement does not mean that 
Congress meant to give “navigable waters” a specific and broad meaning, considering that it 
failed to set forth such a definition in the Act itself.  On the flip side, Justice Scalia relied instead 
 
62 See Lance D. Wood, supra note 41, at 10194.  For a good discussion of the phenomenon; see 
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and is it "To the 
Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 375 (1997) (concluding that many state legislators are fearful 
of discouraging business). 
 
63 In the Clean Air Act as originally amended, for example, states were granted nearly 
unfettered discretion as to how to regulate air pollution within the state to meet air quality 
requirements.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7410.  Likewise, in the Clean Water Act, states are authorized to 
set their own water quality standards and the n to take whatever steps they desire to meet these 
standards.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1313.  Outside of environmental law, a trend of federal law is to 
grant more discretion for states to follow their own course.  In the landmark welfare act of 1996, 
for example, states were given wide leeway to set their own standards for the receipt of federal 
assistance money.  See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§101-16, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 
(2006)). 
 
64 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).  
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in Rapanos on other language in the Act’s introductory section about the statute’s retaining the 
“primary responsibilities” of the states for water pollution control.65 Without any more 
specificity in details, this last statement seems to be merely a sop to federalists; both of the 
statements in the introduction seem like the kind of gauzy generalizations that strict judges such 
as Justice Scalia usually give little weight.66 
Lance Wood chastised the federalists for ignoring the fact that it has been “generally 
understood” for the past 30 years that the Clean Water Act’s term “navigable waters” was meant 
to cover more than waters that are navigable-in-fact.67 Indeed, both of the agencies that 
administer that the Act have construed the term broadly.  The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency early on considered almost any body of water to be “waters of the United States” for the 
purpose of regulating pollution discharges under § 301 of the Act.68 With a little prodding from 
 
65 Id. § 1251(b). 
 
66 Although the Clean Water Act’s introduction asserts that it preserves to the states the 
“primary responsibilities” for water pollution control, it then goes on impose very specific 
federal controls, including the requirement that point source polluters use certain levels of 
federally mandated technology in order to obtain a federally authorized permit to discharge their 
pollutants.  See id. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b).  It is difficult to see how such a system preserves 
primary responsibility in the states. 
 Justice Scalia warned in Rapanos against “substituting the purpose of the statute for its 
text,” 126 S. Ct. at 2234, but failed to clarify how a court should reconcile a statue’s textual 
“goals” and general “policies” with its more specific provisions.       
 
67 See Lance D. Wood, supra note 41, at 10192. 
 
68 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006). The EPA’s broad interpretation of “waters of the United States” is 
set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2006).  The term includes even “intrastate lakes, rivers, streams 
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet 
meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds,” if they “could affect” interstate commerce.  Id.  In 
practice, the interstate commerce link is often a given.   
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the EPA and the federal courts,69 even the less environmentally minded Army Corps of 
Engineers has, at least since 1975, interpreted the Act to cover a wide range of wetlands, under 
the permit system for the discharge of dredged or fill material in § 404 of the Act.70 The Army 
Corps’ regulations have included wetlands that are “adjacent” to navigable-in-fact waters and 
those that are used by migratory birds. 71 An Achilles heel of the “generally understood” 
assertion, however, is that such an argument is unlikely to persuade jurists, such as Justice 
 
69 The Army Corps originally interpreted “navigable waters” more narrowly, to cover in effect 
only waters that are navigable-in-fact.  In Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. 
Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975), a District Court held that Congress meant the term “navigable 
waters” to be as broad as possible under the Constitution and that the Army Corps’ 1974 
interpretation was thus unlawful.  The Corps then took a number of steps to regulate more 
categories of waters.  For a thorough explication of the early history of Army Corps’ 
administration of the Act, see Robert W. Haines, Wetlands’ Reluctant Champion: The Corps 
Takes a Fresh Look at “Navigable Waters,” 6 ENVTL. L. 217, 218-24 (1975). 
 
70 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006).  As of early 2006, the Army Corps’ definition of “waters of the 
United States,” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3, closely matched the EPA’s definition, 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s), 
set forth above.  An “intrastate wetland” that affects interstate commerce is considered a “water” 
under § 328.39(a)(3).  This definition presumably was meant to refer to a wetland that lies only 
in one state (confusingly called an “intrastate wetland”) but that in some way affects commerce 
across state lines (thus making it suitable for coverage by the Act).  But the Army Corps’ 
regulations further clarified that “waters” also included “[w]etlands adjacent to” places that are 
elsewhere categorized as “waters.”  33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7).  Thus, the regulations assume that 
there are wetlands (covered by (a)(7)) that do not affect interstate commerce but that are 
“adjacent to,” say, a river that does affect interstate commerce.  If, however, one can separate the 
wetland and river well enough to say that the river does affect interstate commerce but the 
adjoining (a)(7) wetland does not, it presumably would have to be the case that pollution from 
the one does not move to the other.  In this case, it seems odd to include the (a)(7) wetland under 
the Act, considering that other types of water features, such as rives and lakes, are excluded 
unless they affect interstate commerce.  This morass of confusion could be cleared up in large 
part by focusing on the effect of the pollution, instead of trying to categories the wetlands 
themselves.  I discuss a potential solution in part V of this Article.    
 
71 The “adjacent” wetland provision is at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(7), is discussed in the previous 
note.  The less formal “Migratory Bird Rule,” 51 Fed. Reg. 41217 91986), was struck down by 
the Supreme Court in SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174. 
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Scalia, for whom the text of the statute, not what agency officials say they “understood,” 
provides the only acceptable method interpreting a law.72 
One final piece of history cited as evidence by advocates of broad interpretation of 
“navigable waters” was the statement in the 1972 congressional Conference Report that 
Congress "intend[ed] that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible 
constitutional interpretation.”73 The most obvious constitutional constraints are Article I’s 
limitations on Congress’s powers to legislate.74 If Congress desired to cover as many water 
bodies as possible, its only real boundary was the interstate commerce clause, article I, section 8, 
 
72 Judges’ ignorance of what legal practitioners assume might be considered a flaw or a benefit; 
after all, for many years it was “generally understood” that the Fourteenth Amendment allowed 
government’s separation of the black and white races.  See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954) (fourteenth amendment does not allow “separate but equal” public schools for 
blacks and whites), overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  It was also 
“understood” that the First Amendment allowed public-figure plaintiffs to recover for negligent 
defamation, until judges concluded that the words of the First Amendment demanded greater 
protection of the individual.  See Sullivan v. New York Times, 376 U.S. 254 (1965) (first 
amendment requires that people be allowed to speak about public figures without fear of losing a 
defamation suit, unless the speaker held “actual malice” in making the false statement).  
 Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence is at times refreshing, in that it can cut through layers of 
accreted doctrine to get at the essence of the matter.  See, e.g.,  Nat'l Treasury Employees Union 
v. Von Raab,  489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1398 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting in a major drug-
testing case for federal employees, and recognizing that such tests are largely “symbolic 
opposition” and that such a symbolic step cannot overcome the affront to personal dignity and 
rights that the test entails); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) (calling 
land use exactions “extortion,” which many conservatives no doubt felt but were to delicate to 
say). It can also be frightening, in its rejection of what many assume are commonly held values, 
such as his occasional rejection of the concept of judicial review of agency when it suits him.  
See Lujan v, Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 552 (1992) (finding a lack of standing to challenge 
a wildlife policy).  
 
73 S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 144 (1972), reprinted at 1972 U.S. Code. Cong. & Admin. 
News 3668, 3822. 
 
74 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (powers of Congress). 
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which is the constitutional authority for most social and environmental legislation.75 In the well-
known history of the commerce power, addressed in Part III of this article, the Supreme Court 
struck down much of modern social legislation in the early twentieth century, only to reverse 
itself and uphold legislation against each and every legal challenge from 1937 until 1995, when a 
new generation of federalists, including Justice Scalia, revived the notion that there are some 
realms in which the states hold the exclusive power to regulate.76 Although laws that 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce are still permitted, statutes that do not directly regulate 
commerce are vulnerable to this new federalist scrutiny.77 Through SWANCC and Rapanos, the 
Clean Water Act has suffered the sharpest blows of this new federalism.78 
75 See id.; see also, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) 
(upholding on commerce power grounds a federal law regulating the operation of strip mines); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding on commerce power grounds title II of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, which prohibits race discrimination against public 
restaurant patrons).  
 
76 The decision in Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), was the first time in more than 
half a century that the Court struck down a congressional statute as exceeding Congress’ 
commerce power.  For one thoughtful discussion of the dormancy and revival of commerce 
clause federalism, see John Shane, Federalism’s “Old Deal”:  What’s Right and Wrong With 
Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILLA. L. REV. 201 (2000). 
 
77 Lopez struck down the relatively obscure Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) 
(1988); it was followed by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which overturned the 
relatively obscure Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).  In Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers [SWANCC], 531
U.S. 159 (2001), the Court for the first time used its revived federalism to curb a major federal 
statute, albeit through the means of using the limitations of the commerce power to construct a 
narrow statutory interpretation of the key term “navigable waters.” 
 
78 The Supreme Court followed SWANCC with Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 
(2006), in which a plurality of the Court would have narrowed “navigable water” generally to 
include only relatively permanent water bodies, such as lakes, rivers, and streams.  See id. at 
2220-21 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
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Once the commerce clause enters the debate over interpreting the Act, we may see – perhaps 
ironically – some common ground under the positions of environmentalists such as Lance Wood, 
who want the federal government to hold a wide power to regulate discharges into water, and 
federalists such as Justice Scalia, who scorn federal laws that usurp what he sees as state 
prerogative.  These two sides must agree on these points:  Congress may regulate water pollution 
as far as the commerce clause allows, but Congress cannot regulate beyond its constitutional 
power.  Accordingly, as I endeavor to explain the Part V, it makes sense to re-craft the reach of 
the Clean Water Act under these criteria.              
To conclude this otherwise largely fruitless excursion into the “meaning” of “navigable 
waters” and its definition in the 1972 Act, let me provide what I admittedly call a speculation as 
what transpired in Congress in 1972.  This speculation is no doubt overly simplistic, but it is 
consistent, I believe, with the evidence of Congress’ actions.   Environmentalists in 1972 of 
course desired a federal act that would cover as much water pollution as possible;79 as explained 
below, the Act’s most significant step was to require all “point source” polluters (that is, largely, 
industrial polluters) to cut back their pollution through the use of “best technology.”80 As with 
all national regulatory legislation, however, federalists opposed national arrogation of regulatory 
power that could be retained by the states.81 Perhaps in order to assuage skeptics that the statute 
 
79 Rep. John Dingell (D.-Mich.), a leading sponsor of the Act in the House, stated on the floor 
of the House during the 1972 debate that “the conference bill defines the term ‘navigable waters’ 
broadly for water quality purposes.” See House Consideration of the Report of the Conference 
Committee, Oct. 4, 1972, reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 250-51 (1973). 
 
80 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b) (2006). 
 
81 President Richard Nixon vetoed the measure because it would result in “extreme and needless 
overspending.”  See Message From the President of the United States Returning Without 
 ( … continued on next page …) 
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did nothing revolutionary, the drafters retained the linchpin term that had been used in national 
water law since the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act – “navigable waters.”82 To give this somewhat 
elastic term a broader meaning, however, its definition was not explicitly tied to navigation-in-
fact – that is, to whether boats can sail.  To limit a statute only to pollution in navigable-in-fact 
waters would leave enormous stretches of the nation’s waterways, including small tributaries that 
flow into navigable rivers, outside the Act (as SWANCC, Rapanos and their progeny may yet 
do).  Pollution dumped into non-navigable waters would then, of course, often drift into the 
navigable ones.  Perhaps the environmentalist drafters simply used a familiar and reassuring 
linchpin term (“navigable waters”), gave it a vague and potentially broad definition (“waters of 
the United States’), and then simply left it to the federal courts, which had a reputation for liberal 
and expansive interpretation of the laws back in 1972, to interpret the vague and conflicting 
terms.  If this generalization is accurate, then Congress in 1972 took a gamble – a gamble that 
may have paid off for a few decades, but that is backfiring today, as a more conservative and 
federalist Supreme Court finally gets around to construing the vague statutory terms that it never 
fully clarified before in the 30-plus years of the Clean Water Act.         
Finally, how does the commerce clause relate to the original meaning of the Act?  In 1972, 
the congressional drafters probably did not consider the Constitution to be a serious impediment. 
After all, the Supreme Court had not struck down an act of Congress as going beyond the 
commerce power for more than 30 years (and would go more than 20 more years before finally 
 
Approval the Bill (S. 2770) Entitled "The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972," cited in Maria V. Maurrasse, Oklahoma v. EPA: Does the Clean Water Act Provide an 
Effective Remedy to Downstream States or is There Still Room Left for Federal Common Law?,
45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1137, 1148 n.85 (1991).  Congress overrode the veto. 
 
82 See 33 U.S.C.  § 1311(a) (2006).   
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doing so).  In much of the major social legislation of the 1960s, statutes gave merely lip service 
to the theoretical limitation of the commerce clause.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, 
conditioned prohibitions against race and sex discrimination in employment on an industry’s 
“affecting interstate commerce.”83 In practice, however, the federal courts have paid almost no 
attention to this supposed restriction.84 
By the 1970s, the commerce clause seemed like such an anachronism that Congress did not 
even bother to bow to the commerce power in the major environmental statutes enacted during 
the Nixon and Carter administrations.  The Clean Air Act of 1970 (under which, admittedly, it is 
easy to imagine much air pollution traveling across state lines) did not include any statutory 
commerce clause limitation;85 the wildlife protections of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
were not tied to commerce;86 and the Superfund law of 1980 failed to limit federal cleanups of 
hazardous waste spills to those linked to interstate commerce.87 In the cases of the ESA and 
 
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).   
 
84 In practice, it is nearly impossible for an employer to argue successfully that it is not covered 
by Title VII.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Ratliff, 906 F.2d 1314, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding 
that the use of business equipment made in a different state would be sufficient to justify 
regulation under the commerce clause). The Court in Ratliff concluded that "[i]t is difficult to 
imagine any activity, business or industry employing 15 or more employees that would not in 
some degree affect commerce among the states."  Id. (quoting A. LARSON & L.K. LARSON,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §5.31, at 2-40 (1987)). 
 
85 See 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006) (requiring Clean Air Act implementation plans to meet the 
national ambient air quality standards, with no mention of a requirement that the pollution affect 
interstate commerce).  
 
86 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006) (prohibiting the “take” of endangered species, with no 
requirement that either the take or the species affect interstate commerce). 
 
87 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2006) (authorizing a federal “response” to hazardous substance 
releases if they present a danger to public health or welfare, with no requirement that the release 
harm interstate commerce).     
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Superfund, these omissions have come back to haunt these statutes in recent years, and may 
continue to do so.88 
But no other environmental statute has suffered under the revived federalist scrutiny as much 
as the Clean Water Act, which also contains no explicit link to interstate commerce.89 The water 
law has been the favorite target of the new federalists for a number of reasons.  First is the fact 
that the Clean Water Act imposes more burdens on private property owners; it requires permits 
for thousands of discharges each year – far more instances than the applications of the ESA or 
Superfund on private landowners.90 Second is the fact the Clean Water Act requires a permit for 
activities that perhaps appear to be small matters that do not justify “federal cases,” such as the 
filling in of a small man-made pond in SWANCC or the discharge into a man-made ditch in the 
case of one of the landowners in Rapanos. Federal intervention in such cases must seem like 
unnecessary meddling to a federalist-minded jurist who is concerned with private property 
 
88 Leading challenges to the ESA under the commerce clause have been Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 
F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that protection of the red wolf in North Carolina is justified 
through its fostering of tourism to see the red wolf); National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 
130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (upholding protection of the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly in 
part because of the potential importance of biodiversity and genetic material to future 
commerce), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (U.S. 1998).  The leading challenge to the Superfund law 
has been United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the 
Superfund law is permissible part of a national pollution protection program).  
 
89 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006) (definition of “navigable waters” includes no 
requirement of a link to interstate commerce). 
 
90 In 2003, for example, the Army Corps made 86,177 Clean Water Act permit decisions.  Most 
of these were rather routine grants of nationwide or regional permits – meaning that the 
applicant’s request fit within a category for which the Army Corps had already granted a permit 
– and the Army Corps denied only 299.  See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Regulatory 
Program, www.usace.army.mil/inet/functions/cw/cecwo/reg/2003webcharts.pdf.  By contrast, 
there were fewer than 1000 Superfund sites in the nation as of 2006.  See U.S. EPA, Superfund 
Sites, www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/query/queryhtm/nplccl1.htm.  Justice Scalia began his 
plurality opinion in Rapanos with a complaint about the costs of the Clean Water Act dredge and 
fill permit program.  See 126 S. Ct. at 2214.   
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interests.  Third, and finally, the Clean Water Act’s linchpin term, “navigable waters,”91 seems to 
imply, somehow, some explicit connection to interstate trade.  But Congress gave the Act no 
such link.  In Part V of this Article, I suggest how it could do so now.                   
 
III. MEANWHILE, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE SEEPS TOWARDS THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Rapanos v. United States,92 discussed in depth in Part 
IV.B, gave the federalists on the Court an opportunity to strike a blow against what they see as 
federal overreaching.  But the fractured Rapanos decision raised more questions than it 
answered.  The Court still has not clarified what “navigable waters” means.  Nor has it delineated 
what limits the commerce clause places on national regulation of water pollution, or the bigger 
picture of how federal environmental protection fits with the Court’s new-found federalism.  To 
understand how the Constitution provides a boundary to the reach of the Clean Water Act, we 
must briefly review the remarkable history of the law of powers of Congress. 
 
A.  The Commerce Clause Revives, after a Long Drought, 1791-2006 
 The contorted history of the commerce clause is well known.  Before the twentieth 
century, the Congress of a nation focused largely on local trade only rarely enacted legislation 
that generated a controversy over the interstate commerce power; many the most significant 
debates concerned whether Congress could enact laws to help African Americans – first as 
 
91 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(12), 1344(a) (2006). 
 
92 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006). 
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slaves, and then as freed persons.93 By the early twentieth century, however, the movement that 
came to be known as Progressivism called for new national legislation to address the social and 
commercial problems of a more industrialized national economy.94 As Congress responded to 
these matters, however, hidebound federal courts overturned statute after statute.   In effect, the 
federalist-minded Supreme Court held that the Constitution did not authorize Congress to 
legislate in areas of social values, such as empowering workers at the expense of business, even 
if the law was imposed only on businesses that participated in interstate commerce.  In the “child 
labor case” of 191895 and in the so-called “sick chicken” case of 1935,96 the Supreme Court 
overturned popular social welfare statutes that were only tangentially related to interstate 
commerce.  A famous conclusion came in the latter case, in which the Court asserted that the fact 
that the Great Depression was causing low wages and poor working conditions did not justify the 
 
93 In the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849), the Supreme Court held that Congress 
could regulate the importation of slaves, pursuant to U.S. Const. art. 9, § 1.   
 
94 For a brief history of the rise of congressional legislation in the Progressive era and into the 
20th century, see GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. 
TUSHNET & PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 185-93 (5th ed. 2005).  
 
95 In the “child labor case,” Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), the Court struck down 
a federal law banning many forms of the employment of children by manufacturers that sold 
their wares across state lines.  “The act in its effect does not regulate transportation among the 
States,” the Court reasoned, “but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be 
employed ….  The goods shipped are of themselves harmless.”  Id. at 274.  The distinction – 
coherent if cruel – was that Congress may target a perceived harm in interstate commerce itself, 
but may not target regulate local activity (such as employment), simply by imposing it on 
businesses that then traded across state lines.  Local activity could only be regulated by the states 
or local authorities.   
 
96 In the “sick chicken” case of 1935, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 
(1935), the Court reasoned that Congress exceeded its powers by authorizing a New Deal agency 
to impose a minimum wage and forty-hour work-week for butchers in New York City.  See id. at 
520-21.  Despite the fact that much of the butcher’s poultry traveled across state lines, the Court 
found the law unconstitutional, in effect because Congress’s motivation was not chickens, but 
rather the relationship between workers and employers.   See id. at 527-30.  
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federal law: “Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power,” the Court 
held.97 
By the late 1930s, however, the law of commerce clause was transformed.  One reason 
was that the Supreme Court was infused with new justices, appointed by nationalist-oriented 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt.98 Another reason was the growing acceptance of the idea – still 
argued in effect by the nationalist supporters of the Clean Water Act in Rapanos99 – that 
extraordinary national problems do deserve wide-reaching national solutions.  In NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp.,100 the Court in 1937 upheld a national collective bargaining labor law, in 
part through somewhat attenuated reasoning that because collective bargaining helps foster labor 
peace, it might help the national economy.101 Five years later, in Wickard v. Filburn,102 the 
Court sustained an agricultural price-support bill that regulated how much wheat could be grown 
 
97 Id. at 528. 
 
98 President Roosevelt replaced eight of the nine justices between 1936 and 1942, when the 
Court issued Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), effectively closing serious Supreme Court 
review of  commerce clause challenges for more than half a century.  Another reason for the 
Court’s shift may have been Roosevelt’s 1937 plan to expand the Court to 15 members, in order 
to get it to do his bidding; although the “court-packing” idea was eventually rejected by 
Congress, it may have spurred mind-changes of a justice or two as “the switch in time that saved 
nine.”  For a history of the court-packing plan, see Leuchtenberg, The Origins of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s Court-Packing Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347. 
 
99 See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2258-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing in part that “[t]he 
importance of wetlands protection is hard to overstate”). 
 
100 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 
101 See id. at 41-45 (concluding that the preservation of labor peace and the avoiding of 
“industrial strife” protects interstate commerce). 
 
102 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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by each farmer, including wheat consumed by the farmer at home.103 The law was a permissible 
regulation of interstate commerce, the Court in effect concluded, because even home-consumed 
wheat could affect the national wheat market (if farmers consumed home-grown wheat, it would 
decrease national demand and thus depress prices).104 From Wickard came a crucial principle, 
still generally valid today, that Congress may regulate seemingly local activity if this activity has 
what Wickard called a “substantial economic effect,”105 or what courts today call an activity that 
“substantially affects” interstate commerce.106 
After Wickard, it was smooth sailing for Congress for almost the remainder of the 
century, as Congress legislated in more and more facets of American life, and the courts 
routinely held that the laws passed muster, as long as there was some conceivable link to 
interstate commerce107 The extraordinarily deferential standard of judicial review allowed 
Congress to delve into regulatory worlds that would have been inconceivable in the early 
twentieth century.  The courts approved federal laws regulating loan-sharking,108 the possession 
 
103 See id. at 113-14 & n.2. 
 
104 See id. at 121-31. 
 
105 Id. at 125. 
 
106 See United States v. Lopez, 541 U.S. 558-59 (1995).
107 One realm in which the new deference was especially prominent was criminal law, in which 
even seemingly local crimes became federal offenses if they involved the use of a telephone.  
Under 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (2006), for example, using a telephone or other "instrument of 
commerce" to make a bomb threat is a federal offense.  See United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 
152 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding the statute in a commerce clause challenge).  By 1990, even the 
mere possession with intent to distribute a few grams of crack cocaine implicated federal law.  
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) (mandatory minimums for felony possession of only 50 
grams of crack cocaine); id. § 812(c) (classifying marijuana as schedule I controlled drug). 
 
108 See United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
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of various kinds of firearms,109 killing bald eagles,110 racial discrimination in employment, 
hotels, and restaurants (the holding in Katzenbach v. McClung relied in part on the fact that 
barbecue ingredients traveled across state lines),111 and even the working hours of a state 
government’s own employees.112 One of the most significant and active new worlds of 
regulation has been the federal control of environmental law, which is addressed below. 
The nearly unfettered discretion of Congress began to experience some clouds of 
uncertainty, however, in the conservative age of the 1980s, as President Ronald Reagan 
appointed federalist-minded justices, including Justice Scalia, and elevated William Rehnquist to 
chief justice.  After a number of years of quiet, these clouds resulted in a somewhat unexpected 
cloudburst called United States v. Lopez, in which the Supreme Court struck down, for the first 
time in nearly 60 years, a statute as exceeding the commerce power.113 Lopez concerned a rather 
minor law, the Gun-Free School Zones Act,114 but it revealed that a new Court majority was 
looking for ways to vindicate state and private prerogative over national authority.  First, the 
Court rejected the judicial practice of unquestioning deference to Congress’s finding of a link to 
interstate commerce, concluding that uncritical deference would allow Congress to justify almost 
 
109 See Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977). 
 
110 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979).  
 
111 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964) (upholding Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964), prohibiting 
race discrimination in accommodations).  
 
112 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 
113 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 
114 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988). 
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any statute (which, of course, neatly summarized the jurisprudence of 1937-1995).115 Next, the 
Court revived a disapproval of an attenuated link between the regulated activity (in Lopez,
possessing a gun near a school) and the supposed interstate commerce (in Lopez, the national gun 
trade and the future economic contributions of young people).116 The court did not attempt, 
however – and to date has still not attempted – to set forth any standard for distinguishing 
between acceptable and unacceptable levels of attenuation.  It would be problematic as a matter 
of public opinion, needless to say, to explicitly revive the discredited tests set forth in the “child 
labor” and “sick chicken” cases.  Finally and most significantly, the Court relied in part on the 
tradition that states, not the federal government, have regulated small crimes.117 Although a 
reliance on tradition enabled the court to decide Lopez, it provides little guidance for a 
developing a coherent new law of the commerce clause.118 
115 See id. at 567-68.  The Court wrote that, “Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken 
long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action,” but it rejected an 
approach “to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort 
retained by the States.”  Id. 
116 In the next case after Lopez to strike down a federal law, the Court wrote that “our decision 
in Lopez rested in part on the fact that the link between gun possession and a substantial effect on 
interstate crime was attenuated.”  United Stares v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000).  
 
117 Lopez offered the specter that if gun crime can be regulated by Congress, it could then move 
to other “areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have 
been sovereign.”  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; see also id. at 567-68 (concluding that there must be 
distinction between “what it truly national and what is truly local”).  
 
118 If a gun offense must remain exclusively local, why not drug crime?  In Lopez’s 2000 twin, 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court struck down the Violence Against 
Women Act, which had authorized federal court jurisdiction for gender-bias-motivated violence, 
in the face of congressional findings that such violence discourages women from moving across 
state lines and participating to a full extent in the national economy.   
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The Court in 2005 upheld, in Gonzales v. Raich, a federal law that criminalized 
marijuana possession and overrode a state’s authorization of the drug’s use for medicinal 
purposes.119 While Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Thomas (who wrote a 
forceful separate dissent) stuck to their federalist guns and extended the rationale of Lopez to 
disapprove of the federal marijuana law,120 Justices Scalia and Kennedy voted with the Raich 
majority, which, in a revival of pre-Lopez jurisprudence, deferred to Congress’s argument of an 
attenuated link between the medical marijuana use and the national market for the drug.121 A
cynic might suspect that these justices welcome new federalism when it provides rhetorical 
victories, as in Lopez and Morrison, but not when it threatens national laws they find important, 
such as the federal anti-marijuana law in Raich. In sum, the much-ballyhooed new federalism 
has, so far, created little in the way of workable rules for limiting congressional power in the 
twenty-first century.   
Lopez and its progeny have, however, provided some fairly uncontroversial black letter 
law of the Court’s new requirements for the commerce power.  Although this law offers mostly 
generalities, not concrete answers, it is unlikely that the Court would disavow the black letter 
rules any time soon.  Thus, any federal statute, including the Clean Water Act, must meet these 
black letter requirements.  According to Lopez, Congress may regulate three broad categories of 
activities under the commerce clause.122 First, it may regulate the “channels” of interstate 
 
119 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).  
 
120 See 125 S. Ct. at 2220 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2228 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 
121 Justice Stevens wrote the Court’s opinion, see id. at 2198.  Justice Scalia concurred in the 
judgment, see id. at 2215.  
 
122 See 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
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commerce; this covers interstate highways, railroads, and, of course, waterways on which 
interstate trade can travel.123 Second, it may regulate “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce 
– meaning “people and things” that move or are traded across state lines (possibly including 
natural things such as migratory birds).124 Third – and here is the most common focus of 
controversy – Congress may regulate an activity that is not interstate commerce itself if the 
activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce.125 Under this category, the consumption of 
home-grown wheat could be regulated, as it was in Wickard, because such consumption affects 
the price of wheat in the national interstate market.126 Presumably, this category would also 
include regulation of pollution that significantly hampered interstate commerce such as, say, 
groundwater pollution that caused a significant decrease in groundwater-grown fruit and 
vegetables in California, America’s leading agricultural state.127 
In other cases, of course, there may be disagreement over whether a regulation 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  Consider, for example, Gibbs v. Babbitt, an appellate 
 
123 Id. at 558, citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and 
asserting that Congress may regulate the “immoral and injurious uses” of such channels.  Could 
Congress then regulate anything that crosses state lines on the ground that it is “immoral” – such 
as, say, a gay couple who wants to use an interstate highway to travel to Vermont for a civil 
union ceremony?  Here, of course, Congress would be motivated not by a desire to regulate 
commerce, but by a concern over morality, making it a dubious ground for federal regulation.  
This fact of motivation also distinguishes such a case from Wickard, in which Congress was 
worried about interstate commerce (the national wheat market), regardless of the fact that the law 
regulated local activity (the consumption of home-grown wheat) that took place in only one 
state.    
 
124 See 514 U.S. at 558. 
 
125 See id. at 558-59. 
 
126 See 514 U.S. at 121-31. 
 
127 See University of California, Improved Data on California’s Agricultural Exports (1998), 
http://aic.ucdavis.edu/pub/briefs/brief8.html. 
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decision from 1999 upholding the power of Congress to reintroduce the red wolf to North 
Carolina through the Endangered Species Act.128 The Fourth Circuit majority concluded that 
interstate transportation of scientists and tourists generated by the wolf was sufficient to justify 
application of the ESA.129 A dissenting judge, by contrast, did not consider such movement to 
be either “substantial” or “commerce.”130 Indeed, the standard raises nearly as many questions 
as it answers.  Is it important whether the regulated activity itself is considered commerce or 
trade?  Some court decisions and commentators have suggested that this fact does matter.131 It 
seems illogical, however, to place a demerit on legislation that is clearly motivated by a desire to 
foster interstate commerce simple because the regulated activity is not commerce itself (for 
example, a federal law requiring the teaching of engineering science, which is important for 
global market competitiveness, in state public schools), while giving no such demerit to a law 
that directly regulated trade but that is not motivated by a desire to foster interstate commerce 
(for example, a law regulating the sale of hallucinogenic mushrooms, advocated by social 
conservatives for the supposed immorality of ingesting such fungi).132 
128 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert denied sub nom. Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).  
 
129 See id. at 492-94. 
 
130 See id. at 506 (Luttig, J., dissenting). 
 
131 In Morrison, the Court wrote that one reason for its decisions in both that case and Lopez 
was the “noneconomic” nature of the crimes.  529 U.S. at 609, 610.  See also Jonathan Adler, 
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limit of Federal Wetlands Protection, 29 ENVTL. L. 1 
(1999) (arguing that some regulation of wetlands is unjustified because the activity is 
“noncommercial”). 
 
132 For an argument that congressional motivation should play a major role in commerce clauses 
cases, see John Shane, supra note 76, at 221. 
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Another question is how the magnitude of “substantial effect” should be assessed.  Many 
cases and commentators have concluded that the effect on interstate trade does not have to be 
“substantial” by virtue of the particular regulated legal party’s activities alone; what matters is 
whether the regulation as an aggregated whole substantially affects interstate trade.133 (Thus, it 
is permissible for Congress to regulate the entire trucking industry, including a one-rig company 
that by itself holds no significant effect on interstate commerce).  
Next is the question whether a court is limited to scrutinizing the effect on commerce of a 
statute as a whole, or whether it should go further and test the effect of each provision.134 What 
if one severable provision appears to have no significant impact by itself, such as, perhaps, the 
controversial species reintroduction provisions of the Endangered Species Act?135 Moreover, if 
courts conclude that the protection of threatened species does indeed affect interstate trade in 
some sense, does this then give Congress a carte blanche to impose any sort of law it wants as 
part of this effort, no matter how far removed from the interstate trade?  (For example, could 
Congress impose a requirement that all state public schools assign E.O. Wilson’s book Biophilia 
133 See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28 (aggregating) 32-33; see also Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 
(seeming to approve of the aggregation principle).  In Lopez, the Court seemed to state that if the 
activity regulated was not economic, then the aggregation principle did not apply, see 514 U.S. at 
556-57. 
 
134 See, e.g., United States v. Olin Corp., 107 U.S. 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that 
the Superfund law’s cleanup order provision should be scrutinized under the commerce clause by 
aggregating all of the “on-site” effects of hazardous waste spills). 
 
135 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 2000) (challenging concerning the 
“experimental population” reintroduction rules for the red wolf in North Carolina), cert denied 
sub nom. Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).  
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as part of an effort to build a nationwide ethic of respect for species-friendly daily habits, which 
then might help conserve species, which then might foster future trade in genetic material?)136 
Drawing the analysis more broadly, the Court’s “substantially affects” standard is 
emblematic of the diffuseness of modern constitutional law and the fecklessness of applying so-
called constitutional “tests.”  Because of the uncertainties, the difficulties of line-drawing, and 
vagaries of choosing a level of generality, asking whether a regulation “affects” interstate 
commerce “substantially” simply returns the judge to square one.  The test begs the question.  If 
a particular judge believes in the principles that national problems deserve national solutions and 
that Congress’s findings of links to interstate trade deserve deference, then this judge is likely to 
conclude that all federal statutes pass muster, as Justices Stevens and Souter have done during 
their tenure on the Supreme Court.137 Or if the law is one that a judge finds to be especially 
important, as perhaps Justice Kennedy did in the medical marijuana case, this judge is inclined to 
find that the law passes the test.138 On the other hand, if a judge distrusts the federal bureaucracy 
and favors state prerogative, the judge is likely to conclude that some statutes do not affect 
commerce substantially enough.  This is especially true if the substance of the law runs counter 
 
136 The conceptual “distance” between the regulation and the interstate commerce inevitably 
raises the great dilemma of proximate causation – how close does an activity have to be to one of 
its effect to be considered the legal “cause”?  For a discussion of proximate causation in the 
“take” of endangered species, see Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered 
Species Act, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 756-61 (2002).   
 
137 Justice Stevens and Souter voted in favor of the government in Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC,
Raich, and Rapanos.
138 Justice Kennedy, as well as Justice Scalia, voted against the government in Lopez but for the 
government in Raich.
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to the judge’s libertarian streak, as the heavily bureaucratic, private-property-regulating nature of 
environmental law appears to do with Justice Scalia.139 
Nonetheless, despite its problems, the black-letter law of Lopez concerning the commerce 
clause gives lawmakers a clear command:  Any effort to strengthen the Clean Water Act must be 
done with a close eye to fulfilling the requirement that the statute’s regulations substantially 
affect interstate commerce, in a fairly straightforward manner.  
 
B.  The Commerce Clause Spills Into Environmental Law 
 While the Supreme Court was deferring to the boom of legislation set forth by a 
Democratic-dominated Congress of the 1960s and 1970s,140 one of the biggest changes in the 
American legal landscape took place in environmental law.  In 1960, there was no major federal 
 
139 Justice Scalia has written a number of strident opinions that appear to show an antipathy to 
government regulation of the environment when it hinders the use of private property.  See, e.g., 
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality) (complaining of the burden on 
landowners of the Clean Water Act’s permit program); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) 
(holding that landowners had standing to sue the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service over their 
biological opinions under the Endangered Species Act); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for 
the exclusion of private property land disturbance from the definition of “take” under the 
Endangered Species Act); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) 
(holding that government regulation of coastal land that deprives the owner of all economically 
beneficial use of the property was an unconstitutional taking); Lujan v, Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 552 (1992) (finding a lack of standing to challenge a wildlife policy); Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) (calling government land use exactions “extortion”). 
 
140 The Democratic party controlled both houses of Congress from January 1955 through 
January 1981, when the Senate turned Republican in the coattails of Ronald Reagan after the 
1980 election.  Democrats occupied the White House from 1961 through 1969 (Presidents 
Kennedy and Johnson) and from 1977 to 1981 (President Carter); even Republican President 
Nixon (1969 to 1974) was a supporter of some environmental legislation.  See CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 25 (1990) 
(discussing Nixon’s leaning in favor of environmental protection). 
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statute addressing ecology or the physical environment; within the next twenty years Congress 
enacted complex statutes to establish federal wilderness areas,141 control air pollution,142 regulate 
water pollution,143 protect endangered species,144 impose ecological standards for the national 
forests,145 regulate strip mining,146 divide up Alaska,147 and clean up hazardous waste spills.148 
To the dismay of federalists, these laws were revolutionary in large part because they insinuated 
federal control over private land use, whereas previously it had been subject only to state or local 
regulations.  Thus it is not surprising that aggrieved private landowners have been aggressive in 
challenging the federal environmental laws under the commerce clause.  Until SWANCC,149 
however, they had not been successful.  The first challenge to reach the Supreme Court was 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Association in 1981, in which mining operators challenged a 
 
141 See Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006). 
 
142 See Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2006). 
 
143 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).   
 
144 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
 
145 See National Forest Management Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (2006). 
 
146 See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2006). 
 
147 See Alaska Native Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 
(2006). 
 
148 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006), which followed the regulatory Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6992k (2006). 
 
149 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
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federal law that required specific methods for operating and landscaping closed strip mines.150 
Writing for an extremely deferential Supreme Court majority, Justice Marshall concluded that 
“when Congress has determined that an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts need 
inquire only whether the determination is rational.”151 Congress had asserted in the statute many 
ways in which strip mines could adversely affect commerce, such as by eroding land and 
destroying wildlife habitat.152 For an unskeptical majority, such generalizations were sufficient 
to justify the entire statute,153 despite a questioning concurrence from then-Associate Justice 
Rehnquist.154 For the more actively federalist Court of 2006, the inquiry would no doubt have 
been more probing. 
Since Hodel, perhaps the most frequently challenged environmental law has been the 
Endangered Species Act.  The ESA aggrieves many private landowners because of its potential 
to complicate land use by the unexpected appearance of a protected species on the land.155 A
number of Courts of Appeals have upheld key aspects of the statute, however.  In National 
 
150 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (challenge to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2006)). 
 
151 Id. at 277. 
 
152 See id. at 277-78 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (1976 ed., Supp. III)). 
 
153 See id. at 278-82 (deferring to Congress’s findings). 
 
154 See id. at 307 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).  Justice Rehnquist appeared to be 
biding time until a majority of the Court agreed with his narrower and more skeptical view of the 
commerce power. 
 
155 For example, section 9(a)(1)(B) of the ESA, 42 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006), makes it 
unlawful to “take” a protected species, regardless of whether the species is found on private land.  
The Supreme Court has upheld federal regulations that construe “take” to include incidental 
harm caused by land-modifying activity.  See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities 
for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).   
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Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt,156 a business group challenged the application of the 
ESA to protect the Delhi Sands flower-living fly, a rare and endangered insect that lives only in 
certain sandy California soils; unfortunately for the developers, these soils lie in the midst of the 
economically booming desert region around Palm Springs.157 Although the obscure fly holds no 
apparent direct connection to commerce and does not cross state lines, the D.C. Circuit (chosen 
by the plaintiffs undoubtedly because of its growing conservative reputation in the 1990s) held in 
a 2-1 decision that Congress is justified in protecting all species because of the interest in 
biodiversity, which might in the future provide economic benefits, including the use of unique 
genetic material to create useful drugs and other products.158 Using less cosmic thinking, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded in Gibbs v. Babbitt159 that the ESA-authorized reintroduction of the red 
wolf to North Carolina, which annoyed some local landowners, was justified under the 
commerce clause because scientists and tourists traveled from other states to see the wolf or 
howl with it.160 Somewhat curiously, the Supreme Court, which has seemed eager to review 
other aspects of environmental law for alleged overreaching,161 has never granted certiorari in an 
ESA commerce clause case.162 
156 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). 
 
157 For information about the fascinating fly, see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Delhi Sands 
flower-loving fly, http://www.fws.gov/endangered/i/I0V.html. 
 
158 See id. at 259-64. 
 
159 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert denied sub nom. Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).  
 
160 See id. at 492-93.  A number of tourists travel to participate in “howling events,” during 
which the tourists join the wolf in its late-night orations.   See id. at 493. 
 
161 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (holding that an aggrieved landowner has 
standing challenge a “biological opinion” of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service that it provides to 
 ( … continued on next page …) 
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Like the ESA, the Superfund law authorizes the federal government to regulate land use 
within a state.  The government is authorized to order a private party to conduct a cleanup of 
land on which there has been a spill of hazardous waste; the law contains no requirement that the 
spill extend across state boundaries or affect interstate significantly.163 In the most important 
appellate opinion to date, the Eleventh Circuit in 1997 in United States v. Olin Corp. overruled a 
district court opinion and held that an order to clean up a small spill, whose effects appeared to 
be limited to one state, was constitutionally justified as part of the Congress’s overarching desire 
to protect interstate commerce from hazardous waste pollution.164 This kind of reasoning – 
highly deferential to the government’s assertions and willing to aggregate one incident within a 
fairly broad category of other incidents – is the kind of reasoning that the Supreme Court had 
abjured in Lopez two years earlier, when the Rehnquist Court rejected the government’s 
 
other agencies as part of the other agencies’ duty to ensure that their actions do not “jeopardize” 
an endangered species, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (c)); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter 
of Communities for a Greater Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) (narrowly approving, through 
deference, the regulations that interpret unlawful “take” under the ESA to include some forms of 
non-intentional harm and indirect harm, including habitat modification).  
 
162 The high Court denied certiorari in both the National Association of Home Builders fly case, 
524 U.S. 937 (1998), and in the wolf case, sub nom. Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001). 
 
163 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2006) (authorizing the President to engage in a “response”); id. 
§ 9606(a) (authorizing the president to order private parties to conduct a cleanup of land at which 
there has been a release of a hazardous substance that threatens human safety or the 
environment).  There is no requirement that the agency make any determination that the spill or 
the threat extend across state boundaries or affect interstate commerce in any way.   
 
164 107 F.3d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1997), rev’g, 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996). The 
Eleventh Circuit cited evidence that, as an aggregated category, “on-site” disposal of hazardous 
wastes affected interstate commerce by causing losses to agriculture and accidents caused by 
poor storage of such wastes.  See id. 
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assertions that federal outlawing of guns near schools was justified because it was part of a broad 
national effort to foster a less-violent, more economically “productive” citizenry.165 
Had the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Olin and applied the same type of skepticism 
to the Superfund law that it applied to the gun law, Olin would now be considered a towering 
landmark in a reactionary revolution of constitutional law (of which Lopez would be a mere 
footnote) back to the strict federalism of early twentieth century.  States rights would have 
celebrated its greatest triumph since before the Civil War.  But certiorari was not sought in Olin, 
although it was sought (and denied) in the Endangered Species Act cases166 and in United States 
v. Ho, in which the Fifth Circuit upheld certain criminal provisions of the Clean Air Act.167 Why 
did the Rehnquist Court accept review and strike down the two obscure (and largely symbolic) 
laws in Lopez and Morrison, but ignore cases under the expensive and oft-criticized 
environmental laws?168 I speculate that it might have been because laws such as Superfund, 
 
165 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64 (rejecting the government’s justification through the assertion 
that gun violence near schools results in “a less productive citizenry”). 
 
166 See National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998); Gibbs v. 
Norton, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).  
 
167 See 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 914 (2003). 
 
168 Economists and conservatives have for years been critical of the environmental laws.  One 
of the first major criticisms of the laws’ expense and lack of balance between environmental 
protection and its costs was Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming 
Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1340 (1985) (giving special attention to the costs of 
the Clean Air Act).  The ESA is criticized for its goal of protecting threatened species regardless 
of the cost.  See generally CHARLES MANN AND MARK PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE (1995) 
(discussing the conservation of endangered species in the United States, the effects of the ESA, 
and suggesting a new balance between the needs of people and the environment); see also Tenn. 
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 207-10 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting) (predicting that 
Congress would amend the ESA to reverse the absurd results that it creates in placing the 
protection of species above economically useful activities).  
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ESA, and Clean Air Act are very popular with the public, who see them (perhaps with 
exaggeration) as protecting them from the insidious harms of toxic-generated cancer and other 
health threats (and protecting charismatic animals, in the case of the ESA).169 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has shown a reluctance to address head on the thorny issue of the 
constitutionality of the environmental laws, preferring rather to take potshots at the Clean Water 
Act in SWANCC and Rapanos.170 But the increasingly federalist Court is getter closer to scoring 
a direct hit.  
 
IV. RAPANOS FAILS TO CLEAR THE MUDDY WATERS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
A.  Ripples on the Way to the Rapanos 
 The Clean Water Act is the federal environmental statute with the longest pedigree, 
dating back to the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act.171 It was also the first legislation of the modern 
era of to give most of the regulatory and permitting decisions to the federal government (the 
Clean Air Act of 1970 originally vested states with most of the discretion on how to control air 
 
169 The Superfund law was spurred in part by publicity in the 1970s over a few hazardous waste 
dumps, including Love Canal, N.Y., and Times Beach, Mo.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 96-1016(I), 
H.R. Rep. No. 1016(I), 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1980, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6122 (discussing 
Love Canal).  Studies routinely show that a majority of Americans support environmentalism’s 
goals, even if it not always a high priority.  See, e.g., Belden & Russonello, Current Trends on 
Public Opinion on the Environment (1996), 
http://www.biodiversityproject.org/resourcespublicopiniontrends.pdf#search=%22public%20sup
port%20opinion%20%22environmental%20laws%22%22. 
 
170 The Court skirted the commerce clauses issue in both cases, suggesting but not concluding 
that a broad interpretation of “navigable waters” would violate the commerce clause.  See 
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-73 (relying on the avoidance-of-constitutional-issues doctrine); 
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality) (concluding that a broad 
interpretation would “stretch the outer limits of the Congress’ commerce power”).   
 
171 Ch.  425; 30 Stat. 1151 (1899), currently codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 (2006). 
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pollution).172 Perhaps as a result, the Clean Water Act has the longest record of challenges by 
industry, seeking to avoid the costly demands of the statute.  For example, the Clean Water Act 
was the law through which the Supreme Court in the 1980s held that statutory language giving 
citizens the right to sue polluters when the latter are “in violation” – a term used in many 
environmental laws 173 -- does not generally authorize citizens to sue for a violation that has 
stopped by the time the lawsuit begins.174 This was perhaps the biggest Supreme Court victory 
for business during the first two decades of the modern environmental era.  The Act was also the 
vehicle for a partial reversal of this precedent, in effect, some 13 years later, when the Court held 
that citizens have standing to sue for monetary relief that goes to the government; this surprising 
decision has been the biggest victory for environmentalists in the high Court in the new 
century.175 
172 The most significant requirement of the Clean Water Act is that any discharge of a pollutant 
into the navigable waters is permissible only by obtaining a permit under the Act.  See 3 U.S.C. 
§§ 1311(a), 1362(12).  Permits to discharge dredged and fill material – the way that wetlands are 
disturbed – is granted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  Id. § 1441.  Permits to discharge 
other pollutants are granted by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  Id. § 1342(a).   The 
most significant feature of such pollution permits is the requirement to use a certain level of 
pollution-controlling “best technology.” See id. § 1311(b).  States may take over the EPA’s 
permitting duties upon showing that they can meet the Act’s requirements.  Is. § 1342(b).  
 By contrast, the Clean Air Act as originally enacted gave states wide discretion in 
figuring out how to regulate air pollution to meet air quality requirements.  See 42 U.S.C. § 9610 
(states granted discretion in creating implementation plans for air quality improvement).    
 
173 The Clean Water Act authorizes citizen suits against violators who are “in violation” of the 
Act.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2006).  Similar language is found in the Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2006), the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(g)(1)(A) (2006), and 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (2006).   
 
174 See Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987). 
 
175 See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (holding 
that citizens are given “redress” by the award of monetary penalties to the government because 
such an award acts as a deterrent to future violators, thus giving redress to the plaintiff).  
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Thus it is not surprising that the Clean Water Act has also been the most intensely 
litigated environmental law under the Supreme Court’s skeptical new federalism.  Hot on the 
heels of Morrison v. United States,176 in which the Court in 2000 finally followed up Lopez by 
striking down another obscure statute, the Court granted certiorari in Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers [SWANCC], in which the plaintiff 
challenged the Army Corps’ so-called “Migratory Bird Rule.”177 This rule, which was never 
formally codified, was a somewhat crude attempt to incorporate some links to interstate 
commerce into the working definition of the Act’s “navigable waters.”  The rule stated that the 
Act covered wetlands and other waters if they “are or would be” habitat for migratory birds that 
cross state or international borders, “are or would be” habitat for endangered species, or are used 
to irrigate crops “sold in interstate commerce.”178 
The federalists on the Court held a cornucopia of potential means of attacking the Army 
Corps’ rule as exceeding the commerce clause.  Did the Corps’ odd use of the term “would be 
habitat” mean that a wetland was covered by the Act on the slim possibility that a migratory bird 
might use the wetland at some point in the distant future?  Wasn’t justifying the regulation of a 
water body simply because some of its water is used to irrigate crops the sort of attenuated link 
that the Court had just scolded Congress for in Lopez and Morrison? Moreover, the basic facts 
of the case – an Illinois county agency wanted to fill in a small, man-made pond that had been 
 
176 539 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding unconstitutional the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13891 (2000) with reasoning similar to that of Lopez). 
 
177 531 U.S. 159 (2001).  The Migratory Bird Rule was published at 51 Fed. Reg. 41216, 41217 
(1986). 
 
178 See 51 Fed. Reg. at 41217. 
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created by rainfall at a gravel pit – made it seem at first glance a superb case for challenging 
what federalists characterize as overreaching by the national government.179 An obstacle to the 
commerce clause challenge was, however, a fairly strong connection to one facet of interstate 
commerce in the facts of the case.  The pond was visited by hundreds of migratory birds,180 and 
it was venerable precedent that Congress can legislate to protect migratory birds.181 Indeed, the 
migratory birds might well have be future targets of permitted hunting – thus making them fairly 
solid examples of “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce that Congress unquestionably can 
protect.182 
Instead of the problematic path of confronting the commerce clause head on, the 
federalists on the Court resorted to an ingenious logical sequence.  They combined three 
contentions – (1) an assertion that the Corps’ Migratory Bird Rule raised a serious question of 
whether it crossed over the boundary of the commerce power; (2) precedent stating that courts 
should interpret statues to avoid such constitutional issues in statutory interpretation; and (3) an 
assertion of a supposed tradition of state control of water law – to conclude that the Migratory 
Bird Rule went beyond a proper interpretation of the Act’s linchpin term, “navigable waters.”183 
179 See 531 U.S. at 162-63. 
 
180 See id. at 164. 
 
181 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (ruling that Congress holds the power to 
implement migratory bird protection treaties with other nations through legislation that trumps 
the traditional state control of wildlife).    
 
182 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (Congress may protect “things in interstate commerce … even 
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities”). 
183 See 539 U.S. at 172-74.  The Court relied on the supposed “tradition” of state and local 
control of water and land and the doctrine of avoiding constitutional issues, citing Edward J. 
 ( … continued on next page …) 
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By deciding the case through statutory interpretation, the Court avoided having to resolve the 
thorny issue of the commerce power in relation to protecting wildlife.  And by relying on non-
traditional tools of statutory interpretation – the somewhat obscure doctrine of avoiding 
constitutional issues in statutory interpretation and the supposed tradition of state prerogative 
over water – the federalists also managed to overcome the obstacle of the Chevron doctrine,184 
which otherwise would have given the Army Corps discretion in interpreting “navigable waters,” 
the key term that even the federalists had to admit Congress left unclear.    
 But SWANCC’s interpretation of the statutory term was limited to implying that 
“navigable waters” cannot encompass “isolated,” non-navigable-in-fact water bodies.185 Why 
didn’t the Court narrow the term even further?  The roadblock was the 1985 precedent of United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, in which the Court – in an era of more dormant federalism – 
had held unanimously (including Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, both of whom were essential 
to the five-justice majority in SWANCC) that it was permissible for the Army Corps to cover 
wetlands that were “adjacent” to navigable-in-fact waterways under the term “waters of the 
United States.”186 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988).  
 
184 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) 
(when a statute is unclear, courts must defer to any reasonable interpretation by the federal 
agency authorized to administer the statue).  
 
185 See 531 U.S. at 172-73 (implying that “isolated” and non-navigable-in-fact wetlands are not 
covered by the Act). 
 
186 See 474 U.S. 121, 131-34 (1985) (upholding the Army Corps’ regulation that had covered 
“adjacent” wetlands). 
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SWANCC thus was a victory for the new federalism but a limited one, and it turned out be 
a less momentous victory than it first appeared.  With a few exceptions, lower courts after 
SWANCC found that single-state water bodies were covered by the Act, either because they 
affected interstate commerce in some way, or because of the ecological fact that they were not 
truly “isolated,” by virtue of surface or underground hydrological connections.187 As a means of 
limiting the federal government’s regulation of water – a stated purpose of SWANCC – the 
decision was turning into a bust, as of 2006.  Meanwhile, the Army Corps proposed a rulemaking 
to revise its definition of navigable waters – regulatory redefinition has been a fruitful means of 
constraining environmental law in the administration of George W. Bush188 -- but the Army 
Corps then abandoned the effort.189 The disappointing (for federalists) results of SWANCC thus 
 
187 Cases holding that water features are covered by the Clean Water Act, despite SWANCC,
include United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) (wetlands near a ditch that 
sometimes drain to permanent waters); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 
(9th Cir. 2001) (canals that held water intermittently but were connected to other tributaries of 
navigable waters); Baccarat Fremont v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 425 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (wetlands separated by berms from navigable-in-fact channels); Save Our Sonoran, 
Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2005) (washes and arroyos that spill into a 
permanent river after a rainstorm).  One opinion that applied SWANCC to exclude a tributary 
because it was not “truly” adjacent to a navigable-in-fact water body was In re Needham, 354 
F.3d 340 (5th Cir.  2003). 
 
188 For criticism of the Bush administration’s use of administrative law to curb environmental 
protection, see Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush 
II, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 363, 364 (2004); Lisa Schutlz Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461,
507 (2003). 
 
189 The Army Corps and the Environmental Protection Agency proposed a rulemaking in light 
of SWANNC, see 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (2003), but then did not even issue a proposed rule.  See 
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2235-36 (Roberts, J., concurring).  The Army Corps’ advice to field staff 
was to “continue to assert jurisdiction over traditional navigable waters … and, generally 
speaking, their tributary systems (and adjacent wetlands).”  68 Fed. Reg. at 1998.  This failure to 
revise and shore up the regulatory breadth of the Act should be assessed as a serious error, as it 
surely emboldened federalists to attack the Clean Water Act from a new angle.   
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resembled the limited impact of the other seemingly great victory for libertarians under the 
Rehnquist Court, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,190 which promised in 1992 an 
avenue for property owners to sue government successfully for regulatory “takings,” but which 
later proved to be less than revolutionary in practice in the lower courts.191 This situation must 
have been frustrating for federalist activists, both as litigators and on the Court. 
 For federalist advocates, the hope of SWANCC was running down the drain.  The 
precedent of Riverside Bayview Homes as to “adjacent” wetlands had constrained the Court in 
SWANCC to rule only that “isolated” waters were not covered by the Act.   The word “isolated” 
in reference to waters seems to refer to a hydrological connection, and environmental science is 
not usually a friend to federalists.  It was ecological science, after all, that gave rise to the oft-
repeated quotation of John Muir, “When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched 
to everything else in the universe.”192 This is not a prescription for boundary-minded federalism.  
And environmentalist scientists constantly remind lawmakers that “pollution knows no 
boundaries”193 – again, a notion anathema to the idea of keeping the national government away 
 
190 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 
191 The Lucas Court itself expected that such “total takings” would be “relatively rare.” In 
addition, Judge Stephen Williams, in District Intown Props. Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874 (D. C. 
Cir. 1999), asserted that “few regulations will flunk this nearly vacuous test.”  See generally 
Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background 
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 324 (2005). 
 
192 JOHN MUIR, MY FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 211 (1911). 
 
193 See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1183, 1220 (1995) (“As environmentalists are fond of saying, pollution knows no 
boundaries”). 
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from what the federalists view as state prerogative.194 In sum, as of early 2006, the federalists’ 
effort to limit national power by constraining the term “navigable waters” simply was simply 
drying up. 
 
B.  Navigating the Rapids of Rapanos 
 What other avenue was available for federalists?  An answer was found in the Act’s 
statutory definition of navigable waters as “the waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas.”195 Until recently, this rather odd definition had seemed to be evidence for a 
broad interpretation, by virtue of the fact that it contained no reference to navigation-in-fact.  
Congress imposed no limit on the word “waters,” thus providing support – however shaky – for 
as wide an interpretation as possible.  
 But the Supreme Court had never before endeavored to define precisely what is meant by 
“waters,” a key to the entire Act.  It could have sought clarification in many Supreme Court 
cases involving differing aspects of the Clean Water Act over the past 30 some years.196 It could 
have done so in Riverside Bayview Homes in 1985.  It certainly could have done so in SWANCC 
194 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (rejecting a “significant impingement on the States’ 
traditional and primary power over land and water use”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64 ("Under the 
theories that the Government presents...it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal 
power...."). 
 
195 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). 
 
196 In addition to SWANCC and Riverside Bayview Homes, the Supreme Court heard Clean 
Water Act arguments over the years in, among others, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw 
Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of 
Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994); Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 
49 (1987); Chemical Manuf. Ass’n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116 (1985); 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), and EPA v. California ex rel. 
State Water Resources Council, 426 U.S. 200 (1976). 
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in 2001.  But not until other federalist techniques came a cropper did the Supreme Court finally 
address the basic word of the Clean Water Act – “waters” – in Rapanos v. United States in 2006.  
In this decision, a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the simple word “waters” meant 
much less than how the regulatory agencies had interpreted it for the past 30 some years – by 
looking in the dictionary.197 
As they had done in SWANCC, federalist advocates once again chose a compelling set of 
facts for their argument that the national government has overreached in its administration of the 
Clean Water Act.198 Plaintiff John A. Rapanos wanted to fill in wetlands on his land in rural 
Michigan the 1990s.  Defying the Army Corps’ conclusion that the sometimes-saturated 
wetlands were covered by the Act, Rapanos went ahead and filled the wetlands without a 
permit.199 The Army Corps and the federal government eventually sued him for civil and 
criminal penalties.200 Fellow petitioner June Carabell was denied a permit to fill in a wetland 
that was separated by a berm from a man-made ditch, itself often dry, that ran into Lake St. Clair, 
 
197 See 126 S. Ct. at 2220-21 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality) (using a dictionary to interpret 
“waters”). 
 
198 Federalists are no doubt annoyed even at the Army Corps’ terminology, which asserts Army 
Corps “jurisdiction” over private property that are “waters.”   See, e.g., Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 
2224 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality) (complaining of the Army Corps’ claim of “jurisdiction” 
over “immense stretches of intrastate land”).  Justice Scalia did not clarify what he meant by 
“intrastate land” – after all, all land exists in only one state.  It is the effect of pollution on 
interstate commerce that justifies federal regulation, of course, not whether the land is somehow 
“interstate.” 
 
199 See id. at 2214 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality); id. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Justice Scalia’s opinion did not mention that Mr. Rapanos filled in his wetland after being told 
that he needed and permit, and without applying for one.   
 
200 See id. at 2214 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
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one mile away.201 After losing in both the U.S. District Court and in the Sixth Circuit,202 the 
property owners appealed and obtained a writ of certiorari.   
 The Supreme Court in June 2006 vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgments and remanded for 
reconsideration.203 The Court issued no majority opinion, however.  Justice Scalia wrote a 
plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined.204 Justice 
Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but not with Justice Scalia’s’ opinion or his reasoning – 
leaving the Sixth Circuit without a mandate from the high court on a proper standard for 
resolving the cases.205 In dissent were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, who 
would have affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s judgments for the government.206 
For anyone who might naively conclude that Rapanos, like SWANCC before it, was 
either a dry question of statutory interpretation or merely an exercise in applying abstract 
federalist principles set forth in Lopez, the opening paragraph of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion 
was revealing.  He did not at the outset address the issue of interpreting “navigable waters,” 
discuss its definition as “the waters of the United States,” or proclaim the principle that Congress 
holds limited powers under our constitutional system.  Rather, he focused on the regulatory 
 
201 See id. 
202 See United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004); Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 
203 See id. at 2235. 
 
204 See id. at 2214. 
 
205 See id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 
206 See id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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burden of those who seek to get a permit from the Army Corps under § 404 of the Act,207 and the 
large cost of the permitting program to private landowners, despite the irrelevance of these 
observations to interpreting the words of the statute.208 He asserted that the Army Corps has 
exercised the discretion of an “enlightened despot;”209 it is unlikely he meant to refer to the 
reputation of the Corps in the environmental community as being a pushover for big projects that 
disturb wetlands.210 At the end of his plurality opinion, he claimed that the assertions set forth 
in the beginning the opinion “are in no way the basis for our decision” (he was responding to the 
dissenting Justice Stevens’ contention that these beliefs informed the plurality’s decision on the 
merits),211 but it would be naïve to doubt that these perceived intrusions of the “enlightened 
despot” over private property were in the front of the minds of Justice Scalia and his fellow 
property-rights-oriented colleagues – Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito.      
 
207 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
 
208 The plurality did not then seek to justify their interpretation of “waters” through use of these 
facts – as they could not, of course, being ostensible opponents of judicial activism.       
 
209 Id. at 2214.   
 
210 Environmentalists have for years criticized the Army Corps as being too eager to grant 
permits. In 2003, for example, the Corps denied only 299 permits out of 86,177 permit 
evaluations (although many other cases no doubt involved the grant of permits after negotiation 
with the applicant).  For a sample of the criticism of the Army Corps, see generally COMMITTEE 
ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, BOARD ON ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES AND TOXICOLOGY,
WATER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BOARD, & NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING 
FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT (2001); Oliver A. Houck, Federalism in 
Wetlands Regulation:  A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and 
Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242 (1995).  For a good series of news reports 
about how permits are granted in practice in Florida, see ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Vanishing 
Wetlands, http://www.sptimes.com/2005/webspecials05/wetlands/.  
 
211 126 S. Ct. at 2233 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
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Justice Scalia also noted in the first paragraph of his plurality opinion that Rapanos’s 
fields were more than 10 miles away from the nearest “body of navigable water.”212 He meant, 
of course, a water body that is navigable-in-fact; he did not clarify that the Court has held 
consistently that the statutory term “navigable waters” is a category larger than waters that are 
navigable-in-fact.213 Beyond this, the plurality opinion stayed far away from any discussion of 
hydrological science – the loophole that allowed lower courts to diminish the importance of 
SWANCC – except to assert that material used to fill in wetlands usually does not migrate 
elsewhere, unlike pollution in liquid form.214 This lone scientific assertion supported, of course, 
the plurality’s argument of severing most wetlands from the Act.    
 It is not my goal in this current Article to scrutinize all of the numbing details of the 
Rapanos case – which, after all, included no majority opinion.   Nor do I sort through the tedious 
arguments among the justices over whether “adjacent” wetlands include only those that dissolve 
into river or lakes, or, alternatively, include all those wetlands that are merely spatially close to a 
river or lake – the distinction that formed the fundamental disagreement between plurality and 
dissent over how to interpret “the waters of the United States.”215 I will leave this task to other 
articles.  Rather, my purpose here is to show how far removed from the reality of water pollution 
 
212 Id. at 2214. 
 
213 See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 132-33 (concluding that the Act's definition of 
“’navigable waters’ as ‘the waters of the United States’ makes it clear that the term ‘navigable’ 
as used in the Act is of limited import” and approving of a definition that includes “adjacent” 
wetlands, without a requirement of navigability-in-fact). 
 
214 See 126 S. Ct. at 2233 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
 
215 Compare id. at 2226-27 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality) (arguing for restricting  
“adjacent” wetlands to those with a “continuous surface connection” to more permanent 
“waters’) with id at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that spatial proximity is sufficient). 
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control the level of jurisprudential discussion has become, and to show the value of statutory 
reform. 
 As for Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion, he determined the scope of the Clean Water Act 
in a simple manner – by opening up a dictionary.  To be precise, he flipped the pages of the 1954 
Webster’s New International Dictionary.216 (If only some court had thought to do this 30 years 
ago, millions of dollars in clean water compliance and litigation could have been avoided!)  One 
definition of “water” referred to the plural form “waters” “[a]s found in streams and bodies 
forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.”217 From this rather vague 
statement, Justice Scalia leapt to the astonishingly precise conclusion that, “On this definition, 
‘the waters of the United States’ include only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of 
water as found in ‘steams, ‘oceans,’ ‘rivers,’ and ‘lakes,’ … as opposed to ordinarily dry 
channels through which water occasionally or intermittently flows …. None of these terms 
encompasses transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of water.”218 
216 Why did Justice Scalia use the 1954 WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed.)?  
This dictionary appears to have been the most comprehensive dictionary of American English in 
existence in 1972.  Interestingly, this 1954 edition (which was a revision of a 1934 edition), 
“takes a generally prescriptive (some would call this conservative) approach to word usage.” 
Western Mich. U. Libraries, Finding Word Information: English Language Dictionaries,
http://www.wmich.edu/~ulib/guides/find/dictionaries.php.  By contrast, Webster’s THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, published in 1986, “takes a generally descriptive (some would call 
this liberal) approach to word usage.”  Western Mich. U. Libraries, Finding Word Information: 
English Language Dictionaries, http://www.wmich.edu/~ulib/guides/find/dictionaries.php.  For 
legislative interpretation, a “descriptive” approach would seem to make more sense. 
 
217 Id. at  2220-21 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)).  
Justice Scalia did not cite the Indo-European etymological root of “water,” which is “wed,” 
which means “wet.”  WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954)).   
 
218 Id. at 2221 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
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Under such a narrowed construction, most intermittent wetlands in the nation would 
vanish from the coverage of the federal Clean Water Act, as would streambeds that are 
sometimes dry.  This narrowing of the Act suited the plurality, of course, as this interpretation “is 
consistent with” the Act’s introductory statement that states retain primary responsibility for 
pollution control, wrote Justice Scalia.219 To interpret “waters of the United States” to cover 
most wetlands, as the Army Corps has done, Justice Scalia concluded, “stretched the term … 
beyond parody.  The plain language of the statute simply does not authorize this ‘Land is 
Waters’ approach to federal jurisdiction.”220 
This holding could have been straightforward, if quite dramatic:  Wetlands simply are not 
covered by the Clean Water Act; only rivers, streams, oceans, and lakes are.  But such a decision 
would have required overturning Riverside Bayview Homes, which even the four-justice plurality 
was not willing or able to do.  Instead, they read the 1985 precedent, which had held that the Act 
covered “adjacent” wetlands, as allowing the regulation of wetlands only if they have a 
“continuous surface connection” with a permanent water body otherwise covered by the Act.221 
This inclusion of some wetlands as “waters” did not come from the Webster’s dictionary, of 
course, but by the constraints of precedent – a concession that dulled considerably the impact of 
the plurality’s ostensibly straightforward method of statutory interpretation.  If it is “beyond 
parody” to include wetlands as a category as “waters,” why is it acceptable to include some 
wetlands, simply by virtue of their surface connections?  And why not include other wetlands 
 
219 Id. at 2223 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006)). 
 
220 Id. at 2222.  
 
221 Id. at 2226-27. 
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that hold perhaps an underground connection of equally important hydrological significance as a 
surface connection?  Or perhaps include other wetlands whose destruction might significantly 
harm a facet of interstate commerce?  The reason is that such wetlands simply weren’t addressed 
in Riverside Bayview Homes, and this was as far as the plurality was willing to go.                 
 Justice Scalia’s opinion was noteworthy for a few other points.  First, it was remarkable 
that an opinion about interpreting a statutory term did not include any effort whatsoever at 
construing the congressional intent in enacting the Clean Water Act in 1972; but this is perhaps 
just as well after SWANCC, in which no side developed a compelling argument on this issue.222 
Second, and more troubling, it is extraordinary that a opinion rejecting an agency’s detailed 
interpretation of a concededly vague statutory term failed to mention the law of deference to 
reasonable agency interpretations – the famous Chevron doctrine223 -- until its conclusion, by 
which time, of course, the plurality had already closed its book (literally, perhaps) on what it 
asserted was the only reasonable interpretation. 
 The plurality’s opinion also was disturbingly muddled in its implication that all wetlands 
are excluded, unless they have a “continuous surface connection” with waters that are clearly 
covered.  “In sum,” Justice Scalia wrote, “the phrase ‘the waters …’ includes only those 
relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic 
features’ that are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] … oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’ 
 
222 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-69 & n. 5 (briefly discussing the legislative history and 
concluding that it is “somewhat ambiguous”). 
 
223 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 
(1984) (holding that when a statutory term is unclear, courts must defer to reasonable 
interpretations of the term by agencies, who are, unlike courts, products of the political process). 
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[citing Webster’s].”224 But it is a factual error to exclude all wetlands from “relatively 
permanent” bodies of waters.  Many famous wetlands – including large stretches of Florida’s 
Everglades, Louisiana’s Atchafalaya Basin, and Virginia’s Great Dismal Swamp – are 
permanently covered with water and form permanent geographic features.225 According to the 
regulations of both the Army Corps and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, an area is 
called a wetland not necessarily because it often dry, but because it holds standing vegetation,
such as swamp trees, marsh grasses, and bog plants, that is accustomed to saturated water 
conditions.226 Justice Scalia’s chide about the illogic of “Land is Waters” indicated that he 
 
224 Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
 
225 For information about the various land and water forms of the Everglades, Florida’s great 
wetlands area, including the usually wet mangroves swamps and sawgrass marshes, see Park 
Vision, Everglades National Park,
http://www.shannontech.com/ParkVision/Everglades/Everglades.html.  Louisiana’s Atchafalaya 
Basin is a wetland that is mostly a watery swamp.  See Nat’s Audubon Socy., Louisiana’s 
Atchafalaya Basin, http://www.audubon.org/campaign/wetland/atcha.html.  The Great Dismal 
Swamp, which straddles the Virginia and North Carolina border, is also a wetland that is mostly 
a swamp, of course.     
 
226 The EPA’s definition states:  “The term ‘wetlands’ means those areas that are inundated or 
saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that 
under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in 
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.”   
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (2006).  The Army Corps’ regulatory definition is essentially identical.  See 
33 U.S.C. § 328.3(b) (2006).  
 Swamps are areas with lots of trees; marshes are areas with grasses but few trees; bogs 
are areas with spongy vegetation.   See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Wetland Types,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/types/.   The OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) 
refers to “wetlands” as “usually saturated with water.”  Id. at 77.   
 For more information about what makes an area a wetland, see Virginia Carter, U.S. 
Geological Survey, Technical Aspects of Wetlands Wetland Hydrology, Water Quality, and 
Associated Functions, http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/hydrology.html.  Virginia’s Great 
Dismal Swamp was perhaps the first major wetland to be affected by European settlement of 
North America.  See U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Great Dismal Swamp Nat’l Wildlife Refuge,
http://www.fws.gov/northeast/greatdismalswamp/.  
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assumed that all wetlands are often or usually dry.227 This simply is an error.  Thus, the plurality 
failed to clarify whether they would include within the Clean Water Act wetlands that are 
“relatively permanent” or whether they would exclude these wetlands because they are not 
described “in ordinary parlance” as “streams, oceans, rivers, and lakes.”228 That such a 
fundamental misunderstanding appeared to underlie a large part of the plurality’s reasoning is 
disturbing.  It also gives support to the Chevron rationale that matters of statutory interpretation 
involving scientific judgments should be decided by expert agencies that understand 
environmental science, not jurists that look at a complicated matter only through a single lawsuit.  
 Moreover, while Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion would have allowed coverage of 
“wetlands” with a “continuous surface connection,” the opinion was maddeningly silent as to 
other sometimes-watery features, such as usually dry streambeds (called “arroyos” in the 
Southwest) that, when wet, send water on the surface directly to permanent water bodies, such as 
the rivers that are their outlet.  Many arroyos in the Southwest, for example, are dry for most of 
the year but may flood during and right after occasional rainstorms.229 Because most of these 
arroyos are tributaries of permanent rivers, such as the Colorado River, it is distinctly possible 
that material dumped into the arroyo when it is dry may end up in the Colorado River after a 
storm.  Would the plurality exclude the arroyo from the Act because it is “intermittent” and 
 
227 See id. at 2222 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
 
228 Id. at 2225.  The Everglades is often described as a “river of grass,” see MARJORIE 
STONEMAN DOUGLAS, THE RIVER OF GRASS (1947), but perhaps the Rapanos plurality would 
have dismissed this usage as merely literary.  See id. at 2220 n.4 (rejecting one definition of 
“waters” as merely “poetic”).     
 
229 See Arizona St. U., Basics of the Arizona Monsoon & Desert Meteorology (explaining the 
summer “monsoon’ season in Arizona), http://geography.asu.edu/aztc/monsoon.html. 
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perhaps not even “seasonably” wet (the plurality’s one exception to the exclusion of 
“intermittent” features)?230 The plurality failed to consider the implications of its constricted 
interpretation. 
 These criticisms of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion are not meant to imply that the other 
opinions offered fully satisfactory alternatives.  Justice Kennedy, concurring only in the 
judgment to remand the decision for reconsideration by the lower courts, would have the Act 
protect non-permanent wetlands if they have a “significant nexus” to permanent water bodies.231 
The term comes from SWANCC, in which, Justice Kennedy asserted, the Court contrasted 
“isolated” wetlands with those having a “significant nexus” with navigable waters.232 Such a test 
might make more ecological sense than the plurality’s tighter restraint, in that it presumably 
would allow for protection of all wetlands that are hydrologically connected (even underground) 
to permanent water bodies.  But Justice Kennedy did not endeavor to clarify precisely what 
“significant nexus” might mean, in terms of real-world scientific facts.  What if hydrologists 
opine that some water molecules might migrate from the wetland to the permanent water body – 
would this be enough?  Moreover, the Army Corps’ expert witness testified at trial that the 
wetland that Rapanos filled might have helped to serve as a sponge to decrease water levels in 
the nearby navigable river during floods.  Is this a sufficient “nexus”?   These questions 
 
230 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2221 n.5 (allowing for “seasonal” rivers).  Justice Scalia 
appeared not to understand that features such as arroyos may usually be dry but are predictably 
wet at certain times, such as after August thunderstorms.   
 
231 See id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 
232 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167.  The plurality disagreed with this characterization that the 
“significant nexus” language was the key phrase in SWANCC. See id. at 2231-31 & n. 13 
(Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
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implicate the grand issue of legal or proximate causation – If X might have some effect on Y, 
does this make X a “legal cause” of Y? – that has perplexed generations of both law students and 
jurists.233 The Supreme Court has in recent years been hesitant to delve into the quagmire of 
proximate causation in environmental cases, perhaps because the justices have so little 
experience in an issue that is not often litigated under federal law.234 
Moreover, the “significant nexus” standard fails to address the plurality’s argument that 
the kind of discharges barred by the Act § 404235 – fill or dredged material – are most often soil, 
rock, and sand, which are dumped precisely because they usually do not migrate to nearby 
navigable-in-fact waters.  Indeed, why should the coverage of a wetland depend on a migration 
of water molecules, as opposed to a migration of pollutants in the water, which, after all, is what 
the Clean Water Act is designed to restrict?  Moreover, could there be a “significant nexus” 
through some means other than water, such as that fishermen sometimes transfer bait from the 
wetland to the river, or, perhaps more importantly, that migratory birds use both?   These are 
 
233 For a quip dip into the issues surrounding “proximate causation,” also called “legal 
causation,” see RESTATEMENT (2D) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965) (allowing a “"substantial factor[s] 
in bringing about the harm" to be considered a legal cause); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 
N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (focusing on the issue of “foreseeability”); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. 
v. Miller S.S. Co. ("Wagon Mound No. 2"), 1 A.C. 617, 644 (P.C. 1966) (holding that 
foreseeable risk of type of harm satisfies requirements of proximate cause); see also Buckner F. 
Melton, Jr., Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 Minn. L. 
Rev. 377, 445-46 (1998) (discussing the evolution of proximate causation). 
 
234 For example, in the Supreme Court case addressing the interpretation of “take” in the 
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006), the Court seemed hesitant to read 
simple ideas of proximate causation into the Act, and misread the little that they did address.  See 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713-14 (1995) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 732-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For my critical discussion of the 
Court’s approach to the issue, see Paul Boudreaux, Understanding “Take” in the Endangered 
Species Act, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 733, 755-62 (2002).  
 
235 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
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essential questions that Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” proposal did not answer.  In fact, a 
focus on the activity of polluting the water body, as opposed to a focus on the issue of location of
the water body, can help in the development of a fresh approach to the reach of the Clean Water 
Act, which is addressed in the next Part. 
Finally, the four-justice dissent in Rapanos, written by Justice Stevens, also failed to 
provide a fully satisfying construction of “waters of the United States.”236 Because he 
interpreted the protection of “adjacent” wetlands in Riverside Bayview Homes to include any 
wetland in spatial proximity to a permanent water body, Justice Stevens reasoned that both the 
wetlands at issue in Rapanos were automatically covered.237 As to the broader question of the 
proper meaning of “waters of the United States,” however, the dissenters were cramped by the 
precedent of SWANCC (in which all four of the Rapanos dissenters also disagreed at the time).  
In his Rapanos dissent, Justice Stevens resorted to some of the last refuges of statutory 
interpreters – deference to agencies, the general thrust of the statute, and congressional 
acquiescence.  First, just as the Court had done in Riverside Bayview Homes, Justice Stevens in 
effect tossed up his hands as to what Congress meant by “waters of the United States” and 
deferred to the Army Corps’ broad regulatory definitions (as necessarily limited by SWANCC, of
course).238 One long-term hitch with this approach, however, from the viewpoint of 
environmentalism, is that it is inherently uncertain, as the Army Corps would be free to expand 
or contract the reach of the Act, depending on the politics and viewpoints of the ruling 
 
236 See id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting).    
 
237 See id. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
238 See id. at 2252-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron deference), id.  at 2262. 
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administration.  Over the past thirty years, environmentalists have pushed the Army Corps 
repeatedly to expand the scope of the Act, but there is little either in administrative law or in the 
vagueness of the Act itself to prevent the Army Corps from cutting back its regulatory 
interpretation – as, indeed, it may now do in response to Rapanos.239 
The dissent’s deferential approach was also less than satisfying in that it would allow 
coverage of wetlands by broad categorization:  All intermittent wetlands would be covered as 
long as they are spatially close to permanent water bodies, regardless of whether there is any 
hydrological connection between the two features.240 Why this level of generalization?  Why not 
include all wetlands?  Or why not include only those wetlands in which evidence shows that 
there is likely to be some water connection to the nearby navigable-in-fact water?  In the wetland 
dumped into by June Carabell, for instance, Justice Stevens conceded that “water rarely if ever 
passes from the wetlands to the ditch [which led to a lake] or vice versa.”241 Alternatively, with 
the understanding that wetlands serve ecological functions such as providing habitat for birds 
and shellfish and serving as sponges for stormwater pollution,242 why not include all ecologically 
valuable wetlands, including those that are not close to navigable-in-fact waters, or at least those 
 
239 Because the Chevron doctrine allows an agency adopt any one of a number of “reasonable” 
interpretations of a vague statutory term, the agency is free to change its interpretation, a long as 
the change is reasonable.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 842-45 (1984) (when a statute is unclear, courts must defer to any reasonable interpretation 
by he federal agency authorized to administer the statue).  
 
240 See id. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting)  (deferring to the Army Corps’ regulations covering 
wetlands “adjacent” to traditional navigable waters or their tributaries, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) and 
§ 323.3(a) (1985)). 
 
241 Id. at 2254 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
242 See id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the ecological benefits of wetlands).  See 
also the discussion of wetlands functions in note 6, supra. 
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wetlands that might have underground water connections?   These points again lead to thinking 
about a more ecologically based approach to the Act, as discussed in the next Part.     
Justice Stevens also asserted the practical argument that, in order to reach Congress’s 
stated goal “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters,”243 it makes sense to construe “waters” as broadly as possible.  This is, of 
course, a tautology – if Congress meant “waters” to exclude intermittent wetlands, then the goal 
of the Act would be met without regulating them.  Moreover, an argument of congressional 
intent is hampered by the fact that Congress oddly failed to clarify whether “waters” was meant 
to cover not only rivers, streams, and lakes, but also features such as swamps, marshes, and 
arroyos – something it easily could have done.  In addition, relying on the fuzzy introductory 
statutory platitude of the goal “to restore ... the … integrity of the Nation’s waters” can be 
countered, of course, by the equally fuzzy introductory statutory platitude that the Act was 
intended to “preserve” and “protect” the “primary responsibilities of the States” to regulate and 
prevent water pollution244 – Justice Scalia’s preferred fuzzy source of interpretation.245 
The final words on Rapanos belong to Chief Justices Roberts and Justice Breyer – both 
of whom wrote short separate opinions that, probably unwittingly, also help point to a solution 
for the Clean Water Act.  Chief Justice Roberts, who joined the plurality, wrote separately to 
chastise the Army Corps for failing to revise its regulations in light of SWANCC.246 While it 
 
243 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
 
244 Id. § 1251(b). 
 
245 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2223 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 
1251(b)).  
 
246 See id. at 2235-26 (Roberts, J. concurring).   
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certainly might have been useful for the Army Corps to have rewritten its regulations, it is 
unlikely that the Army Corps could have anticipated and promulgated the astonishingly narrow 
interpretation of the linchpin term of the Act set forth by Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Roberts, 
and their 1954 Webster’s dictionary.  On the flip side of the case, dissenting Justice Breyer also 
called for the Army Corps to rewrite its regulations.247 According to Justice Breyer, however, 
the reach of the Act “extends to the limits of congressional power to regulate interstate 
commerce.”248 While perhaps heartening to environmentalists, this assertion has no basis 
whatsoever in the text of the Act.  And like the Chief Justice, Justice Breyer also called on the 
Army Corps to respond to the decision with new regulations in light of Rapanos. But what sort 
of new regulations?  Is the Army Corps supposed to read the tea leaves, cut back on its 
jurisdiction, and anticipate what approach might eventually garner five votes on the Court?  Or, 
as Justice Breyer suggested, should the Army Corps cover any water-disturbing activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce, while in effect ignoring the statutory limitation of 
“navigable waters”?  Such a move would seem to be doomed, as it would clearly violate the 
holding in SWANCC. However, this suggestion – that law should look to the activities that 
degrade water, as opposed to arguing over issues of location and proximity – points to a new 
vision for statutory reform.   
 
247 See id. at 2266 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 
248 Id. 
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V. A NEW VISION FOR THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
As the extraordinary legal muddle created by Rapanos reveals, the legal crafting of the 
Clean Water Act, its implementing regulations, and its judicial interpretation all have been 
deeply flawed.  Let’s review the errors.  First, it was an error for Congress to create a major new 
regulatory statute whose linchpin term – “navigable waters” – was not defined any further than 
the puzzlingly obtuse “waters of the United States.”  If it was the intent of drafters in 1972 to 
cover not only navigable-in-fact rivers and lakes but also water features such as sometimes-dry 
wetlands and arroyos, it was an error not to make this clear – an error that was a ticking statutory 
bomb that finally exploded (albeit in a somewhat sideways manner) in Rapanos. If the drafters 
gambled by enacting a seemingly limited “navigable waters” statute and then hoping that federal 
courts would construe the statute far more broadly than the term would seem to indicate, then 
this gamble, which may have paid off for many years, has finally proven to be a major error.      
 Since passage of the Act, the federal government has compounded the errors.  Pushed by 
environmentalists, the once-reluctant Army Corps by starts and fits expanded the scope of its 
permit program to cover more and more water features over the past 30 years, without any 
unifying theory of its “jurisdiction.”249 While some of the regulations have included “interstate 
commerce” as a requirement,250 in practice this has proven to be merely lip service; the location 
 
249 The Army Corps’ regulations defining “waters of the United States” are found at 33 C.F.R. § 
328.3 (2006). 
 
250 The Army Corps’ regulation stated that “waters of the United States” include all waters that 
“are currently used, or were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”  33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) (2006).  The terms “used in the past,” “may be,” and 
“susceptible” are bound to make a federalist itch. 
 The inclusion of a required link to interstate commerce does not mean that the 
requirement is employed.  In the federal employment discrimination law, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, it has proven all but impossible for an employer to argue that it is not 
 ( … continued on next page …) 
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and geography of the water body, not the polluting activity, has been the focus of the 
jurisdictional decision.251 These poorly crafted regulations have been errors.   Moreover, the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which administers much of the Act and in theory holds 
oversight authority of the Army’s dredge-and-fill permitting program,252 has failed to guide the 
Army Corps toward a more sensible and logical system of regulation.   This too has been an 
error. 
 Finally, the federal courts have ruled schizophrenically as to the reach of the Act.  In the 
1970s, a District Court ordered the Army Corps to expand its coverage of “navigable waters” to 
cover features that are not navigable in fact.253 This decision was not overturned, or even 
seriously questioned, by any appellate court for decades.  Only after the year 2000, with a more 
federalist-minded judiciary, did the Supreme Court delve into the issue, a quarter century later 
than it could have.  First, the Court reasoned in SWANCC that navigable waters did not include 
 
covered because of the interstate commerce requirement.   See, e.g., EEOC v. Ratliff, 906 F.2d 
1314, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[i]t is difficult to imagine any activity, business or industry 
employing 15 or more employees that would not in some degree affect commerce among the 
states."  (quoting A. Larson & L.K. Larson, Employment Discrimination §5.31, at 2-40 (1987)).    
 
251 In SWANCC, for instance, the simple fact that migratory birds used the pond was sufficient 
for the Army Corps to assert “jurisdiction” over the pond.  See 531 U.S. at 164-65.  The Supreme 
Court failed to reach the issue of whether protecting migratory birds is a justifiable exercise of 
the commerce power, by the ingenious method of deciding that the matter raised a difficult 
question of constitutional law, and that statutes should be interpreted so as to avoid such difficult 
questions.  See id. at 173-74.   
 
252 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(c) (the EPA may in effect veto the Army Corps’s decision to grant a 
permit). 
 
253 In the landmark decision of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. 
Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975), the U.S. District Court held that Congress meant the term 
"navigable waters" to be as broad as possible under the Constitution and that the Army Corps' 
1974 interpretation was thus unlawful, and remanded the matter to the Army Corps to revise 
their regulations.  The Army Corps did not appeal Callaway.
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isolated wetlands.254 Then, in Rapanos, a plurality concluded that “waters” generally include 
only rivers, streams, oceans, and lakes.255 This body of jurisprudence has failed to provide the 
sort of guidance that is needed both by private landowners and by environmental regulators.256 
A unifying feature of this trail of errors has been the effort – ultimately unsuccessful – to 
fit the large round peg of an ecological protection program in the small square hole of the Clean 
Water Act’s reliance on geographic terms – “navigable waters” and its definition as “waters of 
the United States.”  With the reach of the Act dependent solely on all-or-nothing decisions of 
geography and location – a water feature is either a part of “waters” or it is not – a crucial point 
is lost.  This missing issue is whether the water pollution substantially affects interstate 
commerce.   The law fails to ask whether the pollution is significant, and whether it is the kind of 
pollution that is a federal matter. 
 The Clean Water’s Act focus on location, not pollution, runs counter to the usual practice 
under federal environmental law.   The Clean Air Act, for example, generally extends the reach 
of its stationary source permit program to all sources of air pollution that hold the capacity to 
 
254 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72 (rejecting the Army Corps’ inclusion of “isolated” waters 
within “navigable waters”).  
 
255 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2224 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality) (“[O]n its only plausible 
interpretation, the phrase ‘the waters of the United States’ includes only those relatively 
permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic features’ that 
are described in ordinary parlance as ‘streams[,] ... oceans, rivers, [and] lakes.’ See Webster's 
Second 2882.”).     
 
256 See id. at 2235-26 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting that “Lower courts and regulated entities 
will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.”)   Chief Justice Roberts blamed the 
Army Corps for its failure to revise its regulations after SWANCC; he failed, however, to lay any 
blame on the Court for its failure to agree on a definition of “waters of the United States.”  
Moreover, the situation is worse than having to deal with issues on a “case-by-case basis” – as of 
late 2006, there is no controlling law at all on what “waters of the United States” means in regard 
to wetlands and intermittent water features.  
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emit a certain tonnage of pollutants, and does not reserve regulation of harmful pollution in some 
locations to state prerogative.257 Under the law regulating the handling of hazardous waste, 
waste must be bottled up, handled, transported, and disposed of according to strict federal 
requirements, regardless of the location of the waste’s creation.258 When a hazardous waste spill 
occurs, the Superfund law authorizes the government to respond with federal money and cleanup 
orders whenever such a spill threatens human health or the environment, regardless of the 
location of the spill.259 Even the Endangered Species Act prohibits harm to protected plants and 
animals regardless of the location – private or public property, water, land, or air – in which the 
harm occurs.260 
The Clean Water Act diverges from the usual focus on regulating certain categories of 
environmentally harmful activity, regardless of location.  It differs in that it reserves to the states 
the power to regulate water degradation in certain locations – those locations that are beyond the 
mysterious limit of “navigable waters.”  Because Congress is restricted by Article I of the 
 
257 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a-7661e (2006) (general rules for Clean Air Act for permits); id. §§
7502(c)(5), 7503 (permit requirements for discharging pollutants for new major or modified 
sources in nonattainment areas).  It is true that geography plays a role in permitting under the 
CAA, in that sources emitting into air quality control regions with worse pollution hold more 
permit requirements than those in areas with better pollution.  See, e.g., id. § 7511-7511a 
(differing requirements for emission of ozone pollution in different areas, depending on the 
existing concentration of pollution).  These distinctions are made because of air quality 
differences, not to reserve certain geographic areas to state prerogative.     
 
258 See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3005 (2006) (regulation 
for handling hazardous waste, without reference to location). 
 
259 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (2006) (authorizing the President to engage in a “response” to 
such spills that “present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health of welfare,” 
regardless of location); id. § 9606(a) (President may order others to engage in a “response”). 
 
260 See 42 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006) (“take” of protected species is unlawful “anywhere 
within the United States”).  
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Constitution, of course, there must be some limits to congressional legislation, if only in theory.  
But the Act remains muddled to this day, in large part because Congress chose a limitation based 
on location, not on the magnitude or effect of the polluting activity, and failed to clarify the 
division between federal and state authority.                 
 The solution to the murkiness of the Clean Water Act, therefore, should be clear:  The 
Clean Water Act should be amended to refocus on water pollution and degradation that 
substantially affect interstate commerce, regardless of geography or location.  With such a 
revision, the Act would better fulfill Congress’s goal of maintaining and restoring the integrity of 
the nation’s waters, from large rivers to small wetlands, while at the same time giving the respect 
to state prerogative that is demanded by today’s federalists.    
When Congress passed the Act in 1972, it gave little thought to the constitutional 
limitations of the interstate commerce clause, for the simple reason that there were no real limits 
at the time.  Congress had become so accustomed to courts’ approving of any and all legislation 
against commerce clause challenges that it did not see a need to refer to interstate commerce in 
the text of the Act, unless “navigable waters” was meant to do so in a roundabout way.261 
Today, however, a viable Clean Water Act should be re-crafted so as to avoid the regulation of 
activities that are purely within state prerogative under the twenty-first century law of the 
commerce power. 
 
261 As noted in note 250, supra, the Army Corps’ regulations have included an interstate 
commerce requirement, but this is not in the statute itself.   The regulations call for categorical 
“jurisdictional” decisions that place a water feature either wholly in or wholly out of the Act, 
regardless of whether a particular type of pollution or degradation would substantially affect 
interstate commerce in the aggregate.  See also SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164-65 (the fact that 
migratory birds used the pond was sufficient for the Army Corps to assert “jurisdiction” over any 
degradation of the pond). 
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A.  A Revised Approach to the Reach of the Clean Water Act  
 Here is what could be done.  The Clean Water Act should be amended to extend its reach 
to all those categories of pollution that the Supreme Court has held are permissible under the 
commerce clause, as set forth in Lopez and its progeny.   
 Some have questioned whether the Clean Water Act’s provisions on wetlands-filling262 
fit at all within Congress’ commerce power.  Professor Jonathan Adler, for instance, has argued 
that many types of wetlands degradation – especially those relating to domestic landscaping – are 
not “commercial” at all.263 Putting aside the question of how often the filling in of puddles in 
suburban back yards results in the Army Corps’ attention, this argument misses the post of the 
post-Wickard commerce clause jurisprudence.  While the destruction of a small domestic 
wetland might not be commercial per se, neither is the eating of home-grown wheat (the issue in 
Wickard264), the smoking of marijuana for medical purposes (the issue in Raich265) or the 
possession of crack cocaine.266 These noncommercial activities may be regulated by Congress, 
 
262 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006) (permit required for discharge of dredged or fill material 
into navigable waters). 
 
263 See Jonathan Adler, Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limit of Federal Wetlands 
Protection, 29 ENVTL. L. 1 (1999) (contrasting these wetlands-filling actions to the commerce of 
mining in Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)). 
 
264 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 
265 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 
266 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2006) (mandatory minimums for felony possession of 
only 50 grams of crack cocaine). 
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however, because they substantially affect interstate commerce.267 Moreover, to the extent that 
wetlands regulation is motivated by a desire to promote interstate commercial interests, such as 
the protection of fisheries and cleaning up rivers for drinking water, they hold stronger 
justifications to federal control than laws that appear to be motivated more by moral judgments, 
such as perhaps the federal law banning medical marijuana use.268 Nonetheless, a corollary of 
Adler’s argument – that Congress holds the power to regulate the activity of wetlands 
degradation only when such activity either is commerce or substantially affects interstate 
commerce – should be a guide to revising the Clean Water Act in the climate of today’s revived 
federalism.    
 Here is how the Act could be revised.  First, the Act should explicitly regulate pollution 
of the “channels” of interstate commerce,269 such as river systems in which commerce moves 
across state lines.  Second, the Act should explicitly cover pollution that threatens 
“instrumentalities” – in other words, “person and things” – that move in interstate commerce. 270 
This would allow the protection of migratory birds and other species that cross state lines.  Third 
and most broadly, the Act should explicitly regulate pollution that, although not directly harming 
 
267 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (Congress may regulate activities 
that “substantially affect” interstate commerce.)  
 
268 Professor Shane has argued persuasively that it is the motivation of Congress to protect 
interstate commerce, rather than the question of whether the specific activity being regulated is 
commerce itself, that should be the guiding question in answering in commerce power cases.  
See Shane supra note 76, at 221. Using motivation or “purpose” as the determinant, the federal 
law in Raich would be on far shakier grounds, while the wheat law in Wickard would be fully 
justifiable.   
 
269 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. 
 
270 See id. at 278 (Congress may regulate to protect “things” in interstate commerce). 
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channels or things in interstate commerce, nonetheless “substantially affects” interstate 
commerce in some way.271 Examples (of which there are many) include pollution that prevents a 
wetland from serving as a sponge that moderates interstate flooding, pollution that kills shellfish 
that are processed for oils that are sold in interstate commerce, and pollution that significantly 
decreases interstate hunting and recreational tourism at a popular wetland reserve.  Reserved to 
state prerogative would be those polluting activities that do not substantially affect interstate 
commerce.  An example might be the filling in of a small wetland that held no link to interstate 
trade and in which the fill material is not expected to cross state lines.      
 Here is how a revision could fit into the Clean Water Act.  Although both Rapanos and 
SWANCC focused on § 404 of the Act,272 which covers the dumping of dredged or fill material, 
often into wetlands, the true starting point for understanding the Act is § 301(a).273 This section 
broadly makes it unlawful to “discharge” a pollutant without a permit.274 The term “discharge” 
currently is defined to mean the addition of any pollutant from a point source into “navigable 
waters.”275 A “pollutant” is defined to cover almost anything that can be dumped into water, 
 
271 See id. at 558-59. 
 
272 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). 
 
273 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). 
 
274 More specifically, § 301 makes “unlawful” the “discharge of any pollutant,” except as in 
accordance with various provisions of the Act.  See id. § 1311(a).  The most important of these 
provisions are the permit requirements of § 402, for general pollution discharges, id. § 1342, and 
of § 404, for the discharge of “dredged and fill material,” id. § 1344.
275 See id. § 1362(12). 
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including rock and sand.276 Section 404 covers discharges into “navigable waters” of “dredged 
or fill material.”277 
A revised start to the Clean Water Act would target the activities of dumping any 
material, including dredge or fill, into watery areas, when such activities would substantially 
affect interstate commerce.  The linchpin terms “navigable waters” and “waters of the United 
States” would be jettisoned.278 Section 301(a) could be amended to state:   
 
(a) (1) It is unlawful to discharge any pollutant or material, including dredged or 
fill material, into a water area without a permit, as provided for in this Act, if such 
discharge would substantially affect interstate commerce.   
 (2) The term “water area” includes --  
 (A) any water body or water course whose water flows across state 
boundaries or into the territorial seas, including a river and all of its tributaries to 
their sources, regardless of whether they are naturally occurring or human-made, 
and regardless of whether they are wet or dry when the discharge occurs; and      
(B) any area that is sometimes submerged or saturated with naturally 
occurring water on a regular basis or on a frequent basis, including a lake, a pond, 
or a wetland, as defined by regulations authorized to be promulgated by the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. 
 
276 See id. § 1362(6).    
 
277 See id. § 1344(a). 
 
278 The revision would also have to jettison the term “navigable waters” from the dredged and 
fill material section, as well, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).  
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(3) The term “water area” does not include any water inside a building or any 
human-made outdoor water body that has been created for short-term use or for use as a 
swimming pool, or industrial retaining pond, or an industrial water supply facility, in 
accordance with regulations promulgated by the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
 (4) The term “substantially affect interstate commerce” means that the discharge, 
when accumulated with a category of similar discharges, would appreciably decrease or 
impair an aspect of interstate commerce. 
(5) The term “appreciably decrease or impair an aspect of interstate commerce” 
refers to any of the following situations – 
(A) the category of discharges into a water area in which there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the pollution or material that is discharged would move 
across or straddle state lines (either by surface or subsurface movement) or move 
into the territorial seas;   
 (B) the category of discharges holds a reasonable likelihood of decreasing 
or impairing a commercial activity with a national market, such as but not limited 
to commercial fishing, agriculture, industrial manufacture, or navigation, whether 
or not this commercial activity depends on the use of the water area into which 
the discharge is made;  
(C) the category of discharges holds a reasonable likelihood of impairing 
the health or prosperity of migratory birds or other species that migrate among or 
between states;  
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(D) the category of discharges holds a reasonable likelihood of impairing 
plants, soils, land, or air, if such impairment would appreciably affect plants, 
soils, land, or air of more than one state;   
(E) the category of discharges holds a reasonable likelihood of changing 
the geography of or water flow in a region, so that it is becomes more susceptible 
to damage from floods, hurricanes, storms, tornadoes, earthquakes, or other 
damaging natural events; or   
(F) the category of discharges holds a reasonable likelihood of appreciably 
decreasing or discouraging tourism across state lines. 
 (6) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency is authorized to 
determine, in accordance with regulations, whether an activity is a “discharge that 
substantially affects interstate commerce.”  The Administrator is directed to promulgate 
regulations to establish categories of activities that presumptively substantially affect 
interstate commerce, those that presumptively do not substantially affect interstate 
commerce, and those in which a further, specialized inquiry into the effect of the category 
of activities on interstate commerce is necessary.  The regulations will provide for an 
administrative mechanism for citizens, or those who would otherwise be required to 
obtain a permit, to challenge the Administrator’s regulatory presumptions.  The 
Administrator’s regulations and determinations will be subject to review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.   
(7) The Administrator is authorized to promulgate regulations that set forth an 
impact fee for permits granted for the discharge of material, including dredged or fill 
material, pursuant to this section.  Such an impact fee will be based on the level of harm 
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to the environment, ecology, and public health that is expected to be caused by the 
discharge or caused by development that is facilitated by the discharge, not to exceed 
$100,000 per acre of affected water area.       
 
A Clean Water Act revised in this way would refocus the initial inquiry from the 
confusing geography of “navigable waters” and “waters of the United States.”  Instead, the law 
would focus on the activity of discharging pollutants and material, including dredge or fill.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency would create rules to designate certain categories of activities 
as being either presumptively covered by the Act, presumptively not covered, or those in the 
middle that would required a closer look.  This triage system is borrowed from the regulations 
under the National Environmental Policy Act,279 which authorizes agencies to categorize its 
actions into those that normally require the creation of an Environmental Impact Statement, those 
that do not, and those in which the agency makes a further analysis of whether an EIS is 
necessary.280 Probabilities would be based on a “likelihood” standard, not on slim possibilities 
or near certainties.281 
279 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006). 
 
280 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2006).  These regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality 
authorize federal agencies to create lists of kinds of agency proposals that “normally require” an 
EIS, those that normally don’t require an EIS, and those in which a “environmental assessment” 
is needed to determine whether an EIS is needed.  See id. § 1501.4(a), (b).  An EIS is needed 
when a proposal would “significant affect the quality of the human environment.”  42 U.S.C. § 
4322(2) (C) (2006).  An EIS studies the effects on the environment of a proposed agency action.  
See 42 C.F.R. § 1502.10 (2006).     
 
281 The default standard of proof in American civil law is the “more likely than not” standard.  
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gencorp, Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 783 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Allen v. Pa. 
Energy Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996)).   
 ( … continued on next page …) 
79
The categories would be determined by the ways in which discharges can substantially 
affect interstate commerce.  Because almost all “point source” pollution – that is, typically, 
pollution from industrial facilities and other on-going operations – is discharged into flowing 
river systems that move among states or eventually flow into the territorial seas, such pollution 
would remain uncontroversial; it would be covered by the revised § 301(a)(2)(A) and (5)(A), 
which in effect cover all pollution into river systems, including their tributaries.282 The 
categories of presumptive exclusions would likely be some categories of discharges into 
wetlands or other small water areas.  These water areas were, of course, the subject of the 
controversies in Rapanos, SWANCC, and Riverside Bayview Homes.283 
For dumping into wetlands, we might expect that a category of presumptively covered 
activities might be the dumping of a certain amount of material into any wetland that is known to 
support a large population of migratory birds.  Such discharges may be reasonably likely to harm 
the health or prosperity of some migratory birds, triggering the revised § 301(a)(5)(C).  Thus the 
proposed revision would in effect revive the “Migratory Bird Rule” struck down in SWANCC.284 
Current Army Corps regulations cover all waters that “are currently used, or were used in the 
past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce.”  33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(1) 
(2006).  The tem “susceptible” seems to imply a very low standard of probability. 
 
282 Because water flows downhill until it reaches the sea, all river systems eventually reach the 
sea, with the exception of the small river systems of the western desert basins, where water dries 
up, often in “terminal lakes,” without reaching the sea.  See U.S. Geological Survey, Hydrology 
of the Walker River Basin, http://nevada.usgs.gov/walker/index.htm.   
 
283 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2216-17 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality) (discussing the long 
controversy over Clean Water Act coverage of water areas, such as wetlands, that are not 
“traditional interstate navigable waters”). 
 
284 The Supreme Court in SWANCC struck down the Army Corps’ Migratory Bird Rule because 
it did not fit within the Court’s interpretation of “navigable waters,” thus avoiding the 
constitutional issue whether protection of migratory birds is a form of regulation of interstate 
commerce.  See 531 U.S. at 173-74.   The proposed revision to the Act would explicitly list an 
 ( … continued on next page …) 
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Another category of presumptively covered activities might be discharges into a lake that is 
known to support a large number of fishermen who trade in the national fish market.  Another 
category might be the dumping into any wetland along the Gulf of Mexico or Atlantic Ocean, 
where coastal wetlands serve as a critical buffer to storm surges caused by hurricanes.285 
On the flip side, categories of presumptively not covered activities might include 
discharges of small amounts of material into ponds or wetlands that do not appear to hold any 
connection to interstate commerce.  This category might include the dumping of a small amount 
of fill material into a wetland that holds no hydrological connection to any other water area, that 
supports no migratory birds, that supports no fisheries or agriculture, and that does not serve to 
protect against flooding.  Regulation of such dumping would be left to the state and local 
governments.  
In the middle range would be categories of activities in which the potential effect on 
interstate commerce is less clear.  This might include include discharges into ephemeral wetlands 
and small single-state lakes in which possible links to interstate commerce, such as through 
subsurface water movement or by seasonal migratory birds, need further study.  For these water 
areas, the EPA would have to inquire more closely whether the discharge would affect interstate 
 
effect on migratory birds as a way of substantially affecting interstate commerce.  Considering 
the precedent that protection of migration birds is constitutionally permissible, see Missouri v. 
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (ruling that Congress holds the power to implement migratory bird 
protection treaties with other nations through legislation that trumps the traditional state control 
of wildlife), I believe that the proposed statutory provision would pass muster as a way of 
protecting “things” in interstate commerce.  See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.   
 
285 It is well-established that coastal wetlands serve as a buffer to protect humans from storm 
surges; similarly, wetlands near rivers and lakes serve as sponges to decrease flood levels.  See, 
e.g., U.S. EPA, Wetlands, http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/ (with cites to primary scientific 
sources); Juliet Eilperin, Shrinking La. Coastline Contributes To Flooding, WASH. POST. Aug, 
30, 2005, at A7, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/08/29/AR2005082901875.html.  
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commerce in any of the listed ways, through an individualized analysis.  Is some of the fill 
material dumped into the wetland likely to drift into a nearby river, smothering fish eggs?  Is the 
wetland a seasonable home for a number of migratory birds that have just recently built nests 
around the wetland?  Would destruction of a small pond lead to soil erosion that would harm 
farms across the nearby state border?  If the answer to any of these questions is “yes,” then the 
discharge would be covered by the federal Clean Water Act and its permit system.  The revision 
proposed here cannot cover every potential complication, but it would guide the regulators in the 
right direction.     
The proposal would grant the regulatory authority to the Environmental Protection 
Agency, not the Army Corps of Engineers, which would be relieved of having to administer an 
environmental protection program within the context of a military organization.  The EPA has 
been given responsibility for administering the Clean Air Act, the hazardous waste regulation 
statute, and the Superfund law,286 as well as most of the Clean Water Act, other than the dredge 
and fill permit program.287 It makes sense to grant to the leading federal environmental agency 
the task of deciding these crucial environmental and ecological questions.  If it were desirable to 
keep the dredge and fill permit program within the bailiwick of the Army Corps, it could easily 
replace the EPA in the proposed revision.   
 
286 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (2006) (EPA creates the national ambient air quality 
standards); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (2006) (EPA creates 
regulations governing the generators of hazardous waste); 42 U.S.C. § 9615 notes (2006) 
(reprinting President Reagan’s Executive Order 12580 (1980), delegating most of the 
responsibility for CERCLA to the EPA).    
 
287 Under the current Clean Water Act, the EPA, among other duties, sets the “best technology” 
levels for permits issued to point source polluters, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), 1304(b) (2006), and 
issues point source pollution permits under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System, 
see id. § 1342(a) (although states may take over this function, see id. § 1342(b)).   
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B.  Protecting Both Waters and Federalism 
 Both environmental and federalist interests would be served by the proposed revision.  
First, by focusing on the polluting activity, the revision would be superior to the interpretations 
of current law of both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy in Rapanos, both of which would 
exclude entire categories of water bodies from the Act simply because of their location, 
regardless of the potential effects of discharges on interstate commerce.  For example, these five 
justices apparently would remove from the Act any discharges into a wetland that is unconnected 
to a navigable river or lake, even if the wetland serves as the home for thousands of protected 
migratory sandhill cranes (one of the nation’s most impressive and threatened species)288 and 
migratory pintail ducks (one of the most popular targets for wetland hunting).289 Under Justice 
Scalia’s analysis, such a wetland would not be not covered because it does not fit within the 
Webster’s dictionary definition of “waters” and does not have a continuous surface connection to 
a river, stream, or lake.290 And even under Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” approach, the 
wetland’s isolation from navigable-in-fact water bodies probably would remove it from the 
Act.291 By shifting away from asking about location and refocusing on the harm that the 
discharge might cause – in this case, the harm to the species that move across state lines – a 
 
288 For information about the sandhill crane, see Cornell Lab of Ornithology, Sandhill Crane,
http://www.birds.cornell.edu/AllAboutBirds/BirdGuide/Sandhill_Crane.html.  
 
289 For information about the northern pintail duck, see Cornell Lab of Ornithology, Northern 
Pintail, http://www.birds.cornell.edu/AllAboutBirds/BirdGuide/Northern_Pintail_dtl.html. 
 
290 See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2225-27 (Scalia, J., writing for a plurality). 
 
291 See id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
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revised Clean Water Act would more fully meet the goal of protecting ecosystems and commerce 
involving water.      
 But the proposal would not simply expand the reach of the Clean Water Act.  
Considering the Supreme Court’s revived attention to federalism, the Act cannot ignore the 
limitations of the Constitution’s commerce clause.  Indeed, the Court in SWANCC has already 
narrowed the Act’s potential reach because an agency’s regulatory interpretation came too close 
to the outer limits of congressional power.292 The proposed revision would explicitly link the 
federal permit requirement to activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.  This 
requirement would free some small-scale water pollution from federal control and leave 
regulation up to the states.  This is what federalism requires.  For example, consider a housing 
developer that wishes to fill in a small, isolated pond or wetland on land that it owned.  If the 
pond or wetland held none of the links to interstate commerce set forth in the revised Act, there 
would be no basis for federal regulation or a federal permit.  Similarly, because the Act’s trigger 
would depend on the effects of the pollution, as opposed to the location, the discharge of one 
kind of pollutant (say, a chemical that is harmful to fish and that tends to be suspended high in 
the water level) into a particular lake might be covered while the discharge another pollutant 
(say, a neutral material that tends to settle at the lake bottom) into the same lake might not 
require a permit.  
 Such conclusions might disturb environmentalists.   But water pollution that does not 
affect interstate commerce holds no greater justification for national regulation than does the 
logging of trees on private land or the ripping up of native grasslands for crops – neither of 
 
292 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-75 (choosing a narrow interpretation of “navigable waters” 
in part because the regulation of an activity with no apparent connection to interstate commerce 
would raise at least a serious question of exceeding the commerce power). 
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which generally are subject to federal regulation.  Allowing the degradation of local waters when 
there is no apparent link to interstate commerce is a small price to pay for shoring up the 
constitutional justification for more significant degradations of waters that are truly of national 
concern.           
 Moreover, by requiring more individualized analyses of the potential effects on interstate 
commerce of planned discharges, the proposed revision might entail more work for the 
regulators than under the current system, in which simple geography, such as proximity to a river 
or lake, is sufficient to trigger coverage.  Such work might impose a significant new burden on 
an agency, either the EPA or the Army Corps, which is habitually strapped for funds.  This strain 
would be ameliorated by the receipt of money from impact fees imposed on those persons 
receiving permits.  Fees would be based on the expected level of harm to the environment or the 
economy.293 Moreover, an attention to individualized regulation is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s new view of government’s relationship to private property.  In the case of government 
“exactions” of property interests from landowners requesting a land use permit, the Court has 
held that the Fifth Amendment’s “takings” clause requires an individualized determination of the 
specific impact that the permitted activity would generate.294 It is not too much to demand that 
 
293 Governments are using increasingly often using the tool of impact fees, which are imposed 
on private parties that are seeking a permit to do something on private property in a way that 
would do some harm to the public welfare, such as by increasing traffic or removing wildlife 
habitat.  Through such fees, the government allows the private party to do what it wants – thus 
respecting private property “rights” – but discourages unnecessary harm by the deterrent of the 
fee.  The fees also provide money for government to assess such impacts to the public welfare 
and to mitigate these harms with benefits elsewhere.   For a general discussion of impact fees in 
land use, see James C. Nichols, Impact Exactions:  Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence,
50 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 85 (1987).   
 
294 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that a city had to make an 
individualized determination of how much traffic a retail store’s expansion would generate 
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government give similarly focused attention to regulating discharges into water, at least in 
categories of cases which it is not immediately clear that the discharge would substantially affect 
interstate commerce in any way.  
 Finally, the proposed revision does not address the standards for granting permits under 
the Act.  For discharges of a pollutant that is not dredged or fill material, the current Act sets 
forth a system of “best technology” requirements to be written into National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System permits, in order to curb (if not truly “eliminate”) the amount of pollutants 
that enter the nation’s waters.295 States also are required to impose additional permit restrictions 
for discharges into especially polluted “impaired” waters, using a “total maximum daily load” 
mechanism and the state’s water quality standards.296 The proposed revision would not seek to 
change these permit criteria.  For the discharge of dredged or fill material – which has been the 
primary focus both of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and of this Article – the regulatory 
agency could incorporate the criteria that the Army Corps has developed over the past 30 years.  
Prominent among these criteria are whether there are environmentally superior alternatives to the 
 
before imposing an exaction to take part of the retail store’s property for a bike path that would 
ameliorate traffic). 
 
295 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b), § 1314(b) (2006) (setting forth the “best technology” 
requirements); see id. § 402 (establishing the NPDES permit system). 
 
296 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006).  Under this section, each state is required to set forth water 
quality standards – in effect, the maximum concentration of certain pollutants – for different 
categories of water.  Using such standards, the state must then determine the “total maximum 
daily load” for each pollutant.   The state is then required to allocate this TMDL among polluters, 
including both point source polluters and non-point-source polluters.   Because of the complexity 
of these tasks, many states are far behind in meeting their statutory obligations.   For a good 
summary of the long and complicated history of trying to get state to meet their water quality 
requirements, see Oliver Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10469 
(1999). 
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plan to fill in a wetland and whether the project’s success is dependent on the use of water.297 
The rules also require permittees to minimize their adverse impact to the wetland, sometimes by 
helping wetlands elsewhere, including the buying of credits from wetlands mitigation banks.298 
Whether these criteria should be expanded, narrowed, or changed are separate topics that I leave 
for another day.    
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It may seem naïve to propose an expansion of the Clean Water Act in an era in which the 
Supreme Court is skeptical of environmental laws that restrict the right to shape private property.  
But the Court’s fractured decision in Rapanos reveals that the Clean Water Act was seriously 
flawed from the start.  It also gives Congress an opening to craft a water law that more 
effectively exercises its constitutional commerce power and more intelligently respects the limits 
of congressional authority under the new federalism.   Environmental protection still enjoys the 
support of a majority of Americans, and this includes the Clean Water Act, whether out of 
concern for the water supply, concern for strained wildlife habitats, or concern for ecosystem 
benefits that wetlands provide.299 Indeed, with the recent publicity about the role that wetlands 
 
297 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2006) (Army Corps’ regulations guiding the granting of permits, 
including the guidelines that a permit will be denied if there is an environmentally superior 
“practical alternative” or if the project is not “water dependent”). 
 
298 The duty to minimize the impact to the wetland is found at id. § 230.10(d) (2006).  Steps to 
minimize these impacts are at id. § 230.75(d).  For discussions of the practice of “off-site” 
wetlands mitigation banks, see Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, 
Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527, 541-42 (1996); Jonathon Silverstein, 
Taking Wetlands to the Bank: The Role of Wetland Mitigation Banking in a Comprehensive 
Approach to Wetlands Protection, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 129 (1994). 
 
299 See, e.g., Harris Poll #77, Three-Quarters of U.S. Adults Agree Environmental Standards 
Cannot Be Too High and Continuing Improvements Must Be Made Regardless of Cost (Aug. 
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serve to buffer hurricane and storm floods, and the role that disappearing wetlands may have 
played in exacerbating the damage from 2005’s hurricane Katrina, this may be very propitious 
time in which to take advantage of public support for preserving wetlands.300 Merely revising 
agency regulations will not cure the fundamentally flawed approach of the Act’s reliance on the 
location-based linchpin of “navigable waters.”  Revising the Act to target directly pollution that 
substantially impairs interstate commerce in any of variety of ways would both improve the 
protection of our nation’s waters and serve as a model for legislative reform.         
 
^ ^ ^
2005), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=607; Yale Center for Envt’l 
L. & Pol’y, Environmental Poll: June 2005 (asserting a finding of “broad support for cleaning up 
air and water and a desire for more government involvement in environmental protection”),   
http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/environmentalpoll.htm. 
 
300 See, e.g., Statement of Hon. H. Dale Hall, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, before 
Sen. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works (Nov. 2, 2005) (Bush administration official, citing the 
public’s recognition of the need to preserve coastal wetlands, in light of hurricane Katrina), 
http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements.cfm?id=248150; America's Wetland Foundation, New 
Poll Shows Support for Coastal Restoration Gaining Momentum Statewide (2006) (asserting that 
a 2006 poll “revealed that 66% of state residents are very concerned about loss of coastal 
wetlands in Louisiana),   
http://www.americaswetland.com/article.cfm?id=383&cateid=2&pageid=3&cid=16. 
 
